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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Professor Stephen Burbank wrote an article entitled The
Architecture of Judicial Independence.1 It is a foundational piece that gave
structure to what was then an understudied field. At the heart of that article
is a profound insight: stable and enduring judicial systems are the product of
forces in constructive tension. Thus, in the context of judicial administration,
Burbank conceptualized judicial independence with reference to judicial
accountability, and characterized pressure points in the relationship between
them as complementary, not contradictory; and in later work, he made a
similar point about the interplay between the law and policy in judicial
decisionmaking. I could pay homage to Steve in this symposium by praising
his many contributions to our understanding of judicial administration and
decisionmaking. But I did that recently in the online edition of this law
review,2 and I am concerned that if I gave his ego yet another pump, his head
would pop and deflate when he cut himself shaving. Instead, my ambition for
this Article is to honor Steve’s scholarly legacy by emulating his approach to
illuminate the architecture of an under-theorized subset of the judicial
independence and accountability literature: judicial ethics.
As a field of study, judicial ethics is typically relegated to the role of
introverted child in the professional responsibility family, where it is
overshadowed by its outgoing, older sibling, legal ethics. The net effect is
three-fold. First, professional responsibility scholars tend to focus their
intellectual energy on legal ethics and the law of lawyering and show judicial
ethics comparatively little love. Second, what attention judicial ethics does
receive is circumscribed by the professional responsibility “bucket” in which
it is placed, as a consequence of which judicial ethics tends to be
conceptualized, taught, and tested as a body of rules of professional conduct.
The net effect is that judicial ethics scholarship has generally fixated on this
ethical dilemma or that in relation to applicable canons without attempting
to theorize more broadly. Third, by confining judicial ethics to the

Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999).
Charles Gardner Geyh, Considering Reconsidering Judicial Independence, 168 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 35, 36 (2019).
1
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professional responsibility bucket, its relevance to subjects in adjacent
buckets is overlooked.
As a consequence of its diminished niche in a different subfield, judicial
ethics has not featured prominently in discussions of judicial independence
and accountability. The relationship between them, however, is close and
clear. Codes of judicial conduct promote judicial independence as an
instrumental good and exhort judges to avoid sources of influence on their
decisionmaking that could compromise their independent judgment. Those
same codes describe bad judicial conduct, which is the target of accountability
mechanisms generally and disciplinary processes in particular. Accordingly,
understanding how judicial ethics works is integral to understanding how
judicial independence and accountability work.
Notwithstanding the dearth of scholarship on the role of judicial ethics
in relation to independence and accountability, controversies arising out of
efforts to hold judges accountable for alleged ethical lapses have arisen in
federal and state systems throughout the twenty-first century. In the
federal system:
There has been a high-profile, intra-judicial squabble over whether it
is unethical for federal judges to be members of the Federalist Society, the
American Constitution Society, and the American Bar Association.3
Members of Congress and others have called for the U.S. Supreme
Court to adopt its own code of ethics, prompting the Chief Justice to demur,
arguing that such a code is unnecessary and warning that the
constitutionality of ethics-related legislation obliging the Supreme Court to
comply with disqualification rules and periodic financial disclosure
requirements remains untested.4
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was called to task for criticizing then
presidential candidate Donald Trump, in violation of the Code of Conduct
for U.S. Judges, which is applicable to federal judges in the lower courts.5
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas were criticized in the
news for being featured speakers at Federalist Society fundraising events,
likewise in violation of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.6
The Judicial Conference of the United States revised its code of
conduct (and disciplinary procedures) in response to widely publicized sexual
harassment scandals.7

3
4
5
6
7

See infra notes 133–138 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 192–209 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112–116 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 117–121 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying text.
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The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee introduced legislation
to establish an Inspector General in the federal judiciary to oversee the
federal courts. This was done in response to perceived underenforcement of
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, amid the Ninth Circuit’s protracted
investigation of District Judge Manuel Real for ethical lapses, including abuse
of power and improper ex parte communications.8
The media have reported on highly publicized cases in which
Supreme Court Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kagan, and Ginsburg did not
disqualify themselves, despite critics’ exhortations that they do so—an issue
with one foot firmly planted in judges’ ethical obligation to disqualify
themselves when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.9
Court critics in Congress and the media have questioned the ethics
of federal judges attending expense-paid educational seminars at luxury
resorts courtesy of corporate sponsors with litigation pending before the
federal courts on issues relevant to the seminars.10
After Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh was accused of
sexual assault and lashed out against his accusers during his Senate
confirmation proceedings, he became the subject of multiple disciplinary
complaints, and over two thousand law professors signed a letter opposing his
appointment on the ground that his outburst called his judicial temperament
into question.11
In state systems:
There has been a hard-fought dispute over whether judges should
be subject to discipline for violating an ethical duty to avoid the “appearance
of impropriety.”12
Judicial candidates have (with mixed success) filed suits in federal
court, challenging the constitutionality of ethics rules that forbade them from
announcing their views on disputed legal issues; making pledges, promises,
or commitments in relation to cases that may come before them; making false
or misleading campaign statements; directly soliciting campaign
contributions; and engaging in other forms of political conduct.13
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed two state supreme court rulings
on due process grounds because justices on the state high courts of
Pennsylvania and West Virginia declined to disqualify themselves despite
probable bias.14
8 See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 117, 153–156, 184 and accompanying
10 See infra notes 105–111 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 150–151 and accompanying text.
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A protracted ABA ethics initiative that sought to reform
disqualification procedure and require judges to disqualify themselves
from cases in which the campaign support they received called their
impartiality into question collapsed in the face of opposition from the
ABA’s Judicial Division.15
These developments have generated scholarship analyzing isolated ethical
problems with reference to rules and principles embedded in codes of judicial
conduct, statutes, constitutions, advisory opinions, and judicial rulings. But
there has been little effort to step back and think about these judicial ethics
issues on a more conceptual plane, with reference to forces in constructive
tension, in a manner akin to Burbank’s seminal analysis of judicial
independence and accountability. As a result, commonalities among
seemingly unrelated ethics problems have gone largely unnoticed, which has
obscured the path to common solutions.
In Part I of this Article, I conceptualize judicial ethics in a tripartite
architecture, with macro, micro, and relational elements. Macroethics
concern the core principles that define the essential attributes of a good judge.
Microethics refer to the specific canons and rules that have emerged and
evolved to delineate the more practical contours of ethical and unethical
judicial conduct, guided by macroethics principles. Relational ethics refer to
a judge’s ethical responsibilities in relation to other values that constrain the
application of micro and macroethics. Relational ethics thus represent the
outer bounds of a judge’s ethical obligations in relation to, and sometimes in
tension with, other values. These other values include the right of judges to
speak, associate, and conduct themselves without unduly vague or
burdensome regulation; and the interests of judges collectively, as courts and
judicial systems, to operate effectively and with a presumption of legitimacy.
To illustrate this tripartite relationship, impartiality is a macroethics value
that underscores the importance of good judges being unbiased and openminded. A code of conduct canon prohibiting judges and judicial candidates
from announcing their views on disputed issues that they are likely to decide
as judges was a microethics rule that sought to promote judicial impartiality
by forbidding judges from taking public positions on issues that could later
compromise their ability to decide those issues with an open mind. But the
judge’s First Amendment freedom operates as a relational interest that
invalidates the microethics rule unless that rule is the least restrictive means
to preserve the macroethics principle of impartiality—and in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court deemed this speech-limiting
rule unconstitutional.16
15
16

See infra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
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The dictates of micro and macroethics, and the competing values that
relational ethics weigh in the balance, can best be conceptualized with a
metaphor Burbank has deployed to describe the relationship between judicial
independence and accountability: a two-sided coin.17 On one side is the body
of microethics rules guided by macroethics principles that delineate the
conduct of an ethical judge; on the other side are competing relational values
that circumscribe the outer limits of acceptable ethics regulation. Properly
understood, neither side of the coin contradicts or negates the other. Rather,
they complement each other and coexist in constructive tension.
In Part II, I situate the ethics imbroglios summarized at the outset of this
Article, in the tripartite architecture described in Part I. These controversies
have played out in two ways: one, when a consensus emerges, and the other,
when it does not. First, when a consensus emerges, it arises out of a general
agreement that microethics reform is necessary (or not). When controversial
judicial conduct is deemed at odds with macroethics principles, underregulated by microethics rules, and unsupported by offsetting relational
interests, reform will follow; otherwise, it will not. Second, when consensus
fails to emerge, microethics reform proposed in response to controversial
judicial conduct is resisted on the grounds that such action is unwarranted by
macroethics principles and is offset by countervailing, relational interests.
The first context encompasses traditional ethics reform scenarios. The second
context describes a spate of recent controversies that signals something new:
an eroding consensus on the limits of appropriate ethics regulation.
Recent developments, in which ethics regulation has been flouted or
challenged, call the continuing viability of the current macro and microethics
regimes into question. Competing values are gaining strength as the
judiciary’s shared sense of the appropriate scope and contours of micro and
macroethics has begun to fracture. In Part III, I argue that there is an
inevitability to this development, given the nature of judicial politics in the
modern era and a judiciary that is less homogeneous (in terms of race, gender,
ethnicity, and consequently life experience) than when codes of conduct were
first promulgated. I conclude, however, by arguing that ethics conflicts can be
better managed, and respect for macro and microethics improved, by
strengthening the role of codes of conduct in disciplinary processes and
17 Burbank, supra note 1, at 339 (describing the double-sided coin metaphor and its application
to judicial accountability theory); Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law,
Politics, Science, and Humility, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 41, 51 (Charles Gardner Geyh
ed., 2011) [hereinafter Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors] (explaining that the sides of the
coin are complements, not opposites); Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial
Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 117, 118 (1996) (arguing judicial independence and accountability
“need not and should not be at war with one another” and that it “should be impossible . . . to think
about one without thinking about the other”).
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revitalizing a consensus in favor of core ethics norms that has been eroded by
neglect, partisan politics, and judicial self-interest.
I. THE TRIPARTITE ARCHITECTURE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Judicial accountability is a busy place. Judges are variously subject to
impeachment (as well as other forms of removal in state systems), discipline,
disqualification, popular elections (in most state systems), appellate review,
and legislative oversight, among other accountability-promoting processes. In
the judicial accountability venture, judicial ethics occupies the role of
omnipresent silent partner. Ethical lapses, manifested in misconduct
antithetical to judicial impartiality, integrity, or independence, are at issue in
virtually all judicial impeachment proceedings and disciplinary actions.
Ethical transgressions are likewise at issue in judicial disqualification
proceedings, when judges preside over cases in the teeth of patent bias or
conflicts of interest; in judicial elections, when the ethics of judicial
candidates—including campaign ethics—become an issue; appellate review,
particularly in the context of original mandamus actions that focus on judicial
usurpations of power; and legislative oversight of judicial conduct—including
oversight of the judiciary’s disciplinary and disqualification processes.
The architecture of judicial ethics includes three distinct elements: the
overarching principles of judicial ethics, the specific rules of judicial ethics,
and the limits of judicial ethics in relation to competing values and objectives.
I denominate these features macroethics, microethics, and relational
ethics, respectively.
A. Macroethics
Macroethics, as I use the term here, are first principles. They encompass
the instrumental values associated with being a good judge, and the objectives
that those values serve. Four such values recur in literature spanning
millennia: a good judge is honest, impartial, independent, and capable.18
Honesty or integrity is a defining feature of a good judge that has long
been highlighted in literature—often by its absence. The dishonest judge who
abuses his office by taking bribes, soliciting gifts, or trading on the power of
his position for personal gain in other ways has been a persistent object of
concern for literally thousands of years.19
C HARLES G ARDNER G EYH, C OURTING P ERIL: T HE P OLITICAL T RANSFORMATION
A MERICAN JUDICIARY 63-69 (2016) (describing four recurring values in literature,
with examples).
19 See, e.g., Shudraka, The Little Clay Cart, in 9 HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES 1, 134 (Charles
Rockwell Lanman ed., Arthur William Ryder trans., 1905) (depicting a story from around the second
18

OF THE
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Impartiality is a second essential quality of a good judge, which is likewise
ancient in origin. Conceptions of impartiality have included multiple facets:
an absence of bias or conflict of interest against or in favor of an individual
party; an absence of bias or prejudice against a party’s socioeconomic class,
race, gender, or ethnicity; and an absence of pre-commitment in relation to
an issue before the court.20
Independence, a third instrumental value, has a more uncertain past. On
the one hand, the New Testament story of Pontius Pilate—whom Christians
revile for judging Jesus blameless but relenting to his crucifixion after an
angry crowd warned Pilate that if he released Jesus he was “no friend of
Caesar”21—suggests that concern for judicial dependence is longstanding. On
the other hand, because judges were historically adjuncts to the monarch,
judicial independence from political interference and control is not as deeply
rooted a defining quality of the “good judge.”22 In Anglo-American law, that
came later, beginning with the 1701 Act of Settlement in England, which
guaranteed English judges tenure during good behavior,23 and the ratification
of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, which did the same for federal judges in the
United States.24 It warrants clarification that judicial independence can be
conceptualized in structural and behavioral terms.25 Structural independence
refers to formal structures—like clauses in constitutions that protect judicial
century B.C.E., suspected to have been written by an Indian king, warning judges to be “[u]ntouched
by avarice”); KATHLEEN E. KENNEDY, MAINTENANCE, MEED, AND MARRIAGE IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLISH LITERATURE 92, 96 (2009) (recounting the views of Nassington and Gower expressing
concerns about the pervasiveness of problematic gifts and bribes in fourteenth century England).
20 For example, the judge in Joan of Arc’s trial was criticized in biographical non-fiction for
presiding despite a bias against her: “[T]his proposed judge was the prisoner’s outspoken enemy,
and therefore he was incompetent to try her.” 2 MARK TWAIN, PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF
JOAN OF ARC 114-15 (New York, Harper & Bros. Publishers 1896). Medieval poets decried “class
justice” as a form of partiality: “[A] poor man can hardly ever win against a rich man or a nobleman,
no matter how just his case may be . . . .” Theo Meder, Tales of Tricks and Greed and Big Surprises:
Laymen’s Views of the Law in Dutch Oral Narrative, 21 HUMOR 435, 438 (2008). And authors chided
the nineteenth century hanging judge for ideological bias in relation to the issue of capital
punishment: “[H]e did not affect the virtue of impartiality; this was no case for refinement; there
was a man to be hanged, he would have said, and he was haanging [sic] him. Nor was it possible to
see his lordship, and acquit him of gusto in the task.” ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE WEIR OF
HERMISTON 25 (Catherine Kerrigan ed., Edinburgh Univ. Press 1995) (1896).
21 John 19:12.
22 For example, in The Little Clay Cart, Shudraka described the role of a judge and its limits:
“An open door to truth, his heart must cling . . . yet shun each thing [t]hat might awake the anger
of the king.” Shudraka, supra note 19, at 134.
23 Wilfrid Prest, Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England, 133 PAST & PRESENT 67, 82
(1991) (explaining that William III’s judges were appointed during “good behaviour”).
24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
25 Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Independence as an Organizing Principle, 10 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 185, 190 (2014) (“The preponderance of judicial independence scholarship is devoted
to qualified independence, which subdivides naturally into structural (or relational) and
behavioral forms . . . .”)
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tenure during good behavior—that buffer judges from external interference
with their decisionmaking.26 Behavioral independence refers to the rectitude
of individual judges to make decisions independently of external pressures
(which can be aided by structural independence).27 In the context of
macroethics, behavioral independence is of primary concern.
The fourth principle, that judges should be “capable,” seeks to capture at
least three qualities associated with judicial fitness: a judge should be
competent, diligent, and possessed of a judicial temperament. The duty of
competence embraces the longstanding view that judges should be well versed
in the facts of their cases and the law they apply.28 Diligence reaches a related,
deeply rooted concern (related, insofar as laziness breeds incompetence) that
judges should be vigilant in doing their jobs, keeping up with their caseloads,
and administering justice expeditiously.29 A judicial temperament, in turn,
concerns the patience and thoughtfulness required to decide cases wisely,
rather than arbitrarily.30
As “instrumental values,” judicial integrity, impartiality, independence,
and capability are not ends in themselves, but are instrumental to achieving
other objectives—namely the rule of law, the effective administration of
justice, and institutional legitimacy. The instrumental nature of judicial
impartiality and independence is easy to appreciate. There is nothing
intrinsically virtuous about impartiality. In a democratic republic, legislators
are expected to be partial to the preferences of their constituents when
making law. Impartiality is a virtue for judges, because of its instrumental
character: it enables them to apply the law that others (be it legislatures,
agencies, or higher courts) have made, without conflicts of interest or bias,
and in so doing promotes public confidence in the administration of justice
and the essential fairness of the judiciary. The same is true of independence:
whereas independence from majoritarian influence can be antithetical to the
role of a democratically elected legislator, it is essential to the role of a judge,
who is expected to divine facts and uphold the law, unencumbered by
fear or favor.

Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 191, 193-96.
HENRY FIELDING, AMELIA 27 (The Floating Press 2010) (1751) (“[T]his office of a justice
of peace requires some knowledge of the law: for this simple reason; because, in every case which
comes before him, he is to judge and act according to law. . . . I cannot conceive how this
knowledge should be acquired without reading; and yet certain it is, Mr. Thrasher never read one
syllable of the matter.”).
29 Id. (attributing judge’s incompetence in law to lack of diligence to do the required reading).
30 FRANKLIN PIERCE ADAMS, FPA BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (1952) (quoting Socrates
for the proposition that the attributes of a good judge include “to hear courteously, to answer
wisely, to consider soberly”).
26
27
28
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Integrity and capability, in contrast, might seem to be intrinsically good
qualities, and thus ends in themselves. But the reason that integrity and
capability occupy a special place in judicial ethics is because they too are
instrumental values that further other objectives core to the judiciary’s
mission: forthright and capable judges are better suited to uphold the law and
promote public confidence in the legitimacy of the judiciary, than are
dishonest incompetents.
The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct—some
version of which has been adopted by the high courts of every state and the
Judicial Conference of the United States—describes in its preamble the
relationship between these instrumental values and the objectives they serve:
The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and
women of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.
Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice
and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the
precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor
the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance
confidence in the legal system.31

These macroethics principles animate the body of rules in the Code itself,
which segues to the second element of judicial ethics architecture: microethics.
B. Microethics
Microethics rules are the specific dos and don’ts of good behavior that
judicial systems have embedded in their codes of conduct, which are guided
by macroethics values and objectives. Unlike macroethics principles, which
are centuries old, the detailed rules of microethics are, with isolated
exception, of comparatively recent vintage.32
In the United States, the circuitous route to establishing codes of judicial
conduct began in the early twentieth century. In 1908, the American Bar
Association (ABA) promulgated the Canons of Professional Ethics,
governing the ethical responsibilities of lawyers.33 The ABA contemplated a
companion project for judges, but decided against it: state and federal courts
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
For a seventeenth century exception, see 2 LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 207-09 (Boston, Estes & Lauriat 1873) (reproducing Sir
Matthew Hale’s eighteen self-imposed rules for his judicial guidance: “Things necessary to be
continually had in remembrance”).
33 CANONS OF PRO. ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908), http://www.minnesotalegalhistoryproject.org/
assets/ABA%20Canons%20(1908).pdf [https://perma.cc/2HBD-L7SB].
31
32
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were under protracted fire for invalidating Progressive Era workplace reforms
on due process grounds, and bar leaders feared that moving forward with a
judicial ethics initiative at that time could be misunderstood as another attack
on judges and courts.34
The catalyst for reform came over a decade later, in the unlikely form of
the so-called “Black Sox” scandal, in which members of the Chicago White
Sox took bribes to throw the 1919 World Series, and major league baseball
responded by hiring a federal judge (and former minor league baseball
player), Kenesaw Mountain Landis, as its first commissioner.35 Ironically, the
hiring of Landis would salve baseball’s black eye, only to give the judiciary a
shiner of its own. When Landis became Commissioner (and began receiving
his $42,500 salary), he did not relinquish his judicial office (or its $7,500
salary).36 The House Judiciary Committee initiated an impeachment inquiry
and in a preliminary report was sharply divided as to whether he had
committed an impeachable crime.37 Although a majority of the Committee
thought Landis had behaved badly, a substantial minority believed that he
had committed no impeachable offense, which underscored the inability of
the impeachment process to address ethics problems falling short of
impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors.38 Landis resigned from his
judgeship before the impeachment inquiry was concluded, but the episode
prompted the ABA to convene a commission—chaired by the recently
appointed Chief Justice of the United States, William Howard Taft—which
promulgated the Canons of Judicial Ethics that the ABA approved in 1924.39
34 See JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 182 (1974) (explaining one of the
prevailing concerns as being that the project would be associated with the “popular movement to
strike back at perceived judicial oppression”); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS,
PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 23-25, 41-44 (1994)
(explaining how Populist and Progressive Era anger with the state and federal judiciaries was
provoked by Lochner v. New York and its progeny).
35 Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting
of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 272-73 (2007).
36 Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights
and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA
21, 27 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007).
37 See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1407, at 2 (1921) (“From a careful consideration of the charges made
against Judge Landis and the evidence adduced in their support, it is believed that the findings
in the foregoing report are unsupported and the recommendation for further investigation
entirely unjustified.”).
38 Id. at 3. (“No violation of any law has been called to the attention of the committee, nor is
it claimed that the judge is guilty of any act that would establish moral turpitude. One or both of
those grounds would have to be established before impeachment proceedings could be maintained.”).
39 See MACKENZIE, supra note 34, at 182-83; id. at 183 (“Taft, a former president of the
United States and past president of the ABA, was a logical man for the task, a symbol of public
correctness whose stature as a jurist and bar organization man would ensure acceptance of the
canons.”); CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924) (enumerating each of the thirtyfour canons of judicial ethics).
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While a majority of the state judiciaries would adopt the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, the Canons were bound for obscurity.40 They consisted of
hortatory pronouncements “intended to be nothing more than the American
Bar Association’s suggestions for guidance of individual judges.”41 They were
thus crafted to operate behind the scenes—gentle exhortations that judges
could ignore without fear of consequence.42
In 1960, California established a Judicial Qualifications Commission with
authority to review judicial conduct and impose discipline on errant judges.43
By 1980, all fifty states had judicial conduct organizations in place.44 As that
movement gained momentum, several high-profile ethics controversies
accompanied a new wave of agitation over the liberal Warren Court. House
Republicans sought to impeach and remove Justice William O. Douglas for
alleged ethical improprieties.45 Justice Abe Fortas resigned from the Court
over ethical lapses.46 Chief Justice Earl Warren was criticized for
moonlighting as chair of the “Warren Commission” that investigated the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy.47 And President Nixon’s Supreme
Court nominee, Clement Haynesworth, was rejected, in part, for presiding
over cases as a circuit judge in the teeth of alleged conflicts of interest.48 In
40 See Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410,
411 (“Notwithstanding this, state supreme courts in a majority of states have ‘adopted’ the
Canons of Judicial Ethics or similar ethical standards, either as suggested guidelines or as
binding rules of conduct.”).
41 Id.
42 The net effect was to relegate the task of judicial discipline to more cumbersome
mechanisms—the lumbering dinosaurs of impeachment and, in various state systems, legislative
address, recall elections, and felony convictions.
43 See Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1,
20 (1977) (“This new method of handling cases of judicial misconduct and disability through a
permanent judicial disciplinary commission was first adopted by California voters in 1960 as an
amendment to the California Constitution.”).
44 See ALLISON COMBS, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE COMMISSIONS: BACKGROUND PAPER 95-5,
at 1 (1995), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/Publications/Bkground/BP95-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YQL6-KC9X].
45 Justice Douglas Impeachment, in CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC: 91ST CONGRESS, 2ND
SESSION 1025, 1025-27 (1970).
46 See Allen Pusey, May 14, 1969: The Spectacular Fall of Abe Fortas, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 1,
2020, 12:05 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the-spectacular-fall-of-abe-fortas
[https://perma.cc/9VR4-MSHT] (noting that Fortas resigned after it was revealed that he was
receiving regular payments from a former Wall Street client convicted of fraud).
47 See Warren Weaver Jr., Tough Code of Ethics Adopted For Judges in Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1973, at 1 (“The new code reflects criticism in legal circles of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s
agreement to serve as head of the commission investigating President Kennedy’s assassination and
former Associate Justice Abe Fortas’s acceptance of counsel fees while sitting on the Supreme Court.”).
48 See Barbara Maranzani, 6 Supreme Court Nomination Battles, HISTORY: NEWS (Oct. 28,
2018), https://www.history.com/news/a-brief-history-of-supreme-court-battles [https://perma.cc/
H7FQ-3K8K] (noting that several high-ranking Republican senators joined Democrats to reject his
nomination after he had earlier ruled in favor of a vending machine business in which he had stake);
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the minds of bar leaders, these imbroglios highlighted the inadequacy of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics,49 and in 1969, ABA President Bernard Segal
established a Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct, which
promulgated a Code of Judicial Conduct that the ABA adopted in 1972.50
Foremost among the perceived failings of the old Canons was that they
had been purely advisory.51 To address that problem, the preamble to the 1972
Code declared that “[t]he canons and text establish mandatory standards
unless otherwise indicated,” adding that “[i]t is hoped that all jurisdictions
will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary procedures for its
enforcement.”52 In effect, the 1972 Code weaponized the Canons to augment
the disciplinary authority of emerging judicial conduct organizations.
Whereas the Canons of Judicial Ethics had been comprised of thirty-four
broadly worded canons or principles, the 1972 Code reduced the number of
canons to seven. Subsumed with each of the seven canons were a series of
more specific provisions, articulated with relative brevity and precision,
which rendered them better suited for enforcement than the more gaseous
pronouncements of the discarded Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Despite the “mandatory” character of the 1972 Code, the Code itself was
phrased in hortatory terms: it featured no “shalls” or “musts”—only “shoulds.”
Such nomenclature may have made sense for jurisdictions like the federal
judiciary, which adopted the new ABA Code in 1973, when it had no formal
disciplinary process in place to enforce and thereby render “mandatory” the
ethical standards it promulgated. But as disciplinary processes became
universal, the aspirational phrasing of the Code engendered a
“misunderstanding” that compromised the Code’s utility for disciplinary
purposes—particularly among states that did not adopt the preamble where
the mandatory character of Code provisions was highlighted.53
In 1990, the ABA approved a new Model Code of Judicial Conduct.54 The
1990 Model Code shrank the number of general, overarching canons again—
Clement F. Haynsworth Jr.; Judge Was Rejected as 1969 Supreme Court Choice, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1989, at A32 (“The most damaging [allegation] centered on his participation in a case involving a
company that did extensive business with another company in which he owned a one-seventh interest.”).
49 See Whitney North Seymour, The Code of Judicial Conduct from the Point of View of a Member
of the Bar, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 352, 352 (“In the controversies over the activities of Justices Fortas
and Douglas, and in the inquiries into the qualifications of Judge Haynesworth for appointment to
the Supreme Court, the inadequacies of the canons became particularly apparent.”).
50 Id.
51 See Martineau, supra note 40, at 411 (footnote omitted) (“Even in those jurisdictions that
have not accepted the Canons as binding rules, the Canons have been given the status of guidelines
or have been used as frames of reference in rendering advisory opinions on judicial conduct.”).
52 CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972).
53 See LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 8 (1992).
54 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990) (“On August 7, 1990,
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
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this time, from seven to five—and swapped out most of the precatory
“shoulds” for mandatory “shalls.”55 In the preamble, the drafters of the 1990
Model Code made their intentions explicit. First, the drafters underscored
the Code’s dual purpose: “The Code is designed to provide guidance to
judges and candidates for judicial office and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.”56 Second, the drafters
emphasized the significance of the term “shall”: “When the text uses ‘shall’ or
‘shall not,’ it is intended to impose binding obligations the violation of which
can result in disciplinary action.”57 The phrase “can result in disciplinary
action,” however, was used advisedly: “It is not intended,” the drafters
cautioned, “that every transgression will result in disciplinary action.”58
Rather, “[w]hether disciplinary action is appropriate . . . should depend on
such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern
of improper activity and the effect of the improper activity on others or on
the judicial system.”59
In 2007, the ABA approved another Model Code of Judicial Conduct.60
Like the 1990 Model Code, the preamble to the 2007 edition reiterated the
Code’s dual purpose.61 But the evolution of microethics away from its original
focus on guidance, toward discipline and enforcement, continued apace. The
number of canons was dropped from five to four, and the specific provisions
underlying those canons were recast as numbered “rules” to emulate the
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct,62 where the disciplinary
orientation of rules phrased in mandatory terms was explicit.63 Consistent
with this ongoing reorientation of the Code toward discipline, the preamble
to the 2007 Model Code omitted its predecessor’s caveat that not all Code
violations warranted disciplinary action.64

In the 1990 Model Code, a Preamble and a Terminology section were added, and an Application
Section followed the Canons.”).
55 Id. Contents, Preamble (noting that the preamble only lists five canons, with each one stating
that a judge “shall” rather than a judge “should”).
56 Id. Preamble.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). I served as co-reporter to the
ABA Commission that promulgated the 2007 Model Code.
61 Id. Preamble.
62 CHARLES E.[SIC] GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT ix (2009).
63 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Scope, at 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“Some of the Rules
are imperatives, cast in the terms ‘shall’ or ‘shall not.’ These define proper conduct for purposes of
professional discipline.”).
64 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
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Microethics rules are explained, interpreted, and justified with reference
to macroethics rationales. Some microethics rules further particular
instrumental values. For example, the rule that judges “shall not abuse the
prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests[] of
the judge or others”65 preserves integrity; the rule governing disqualification
of judges for real or perceived bias and conflicts of interest promotes
impartiality;66 the rule that judges shall not “permit family, social, political,
financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial
conduct”67 encourages independence; and rules regulating judicial
competence,68 diligence,69 and demeanor,70 seek to ensure that judges are
capable adjudicators. Other microethics rules are directed toward furthering
the overarching objectives of macroethics generally. For example, the rule that
judges shall “uphold and apply the law,”71 seeks to promote the rule of law,
while the rule that judges shall “act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary,”72 protects the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy (in addition to
promoting specified instrumental values).
C. Relational Ethics
Macroethics principles and microethics rules, paired with a disciplinary
regime, establish and enforce standards of good (and bad) judicial conduct.
But the limits of appropriate ethics regulation are not delineated by macro
and microethics alone. That is because the dictates of microethics rules and
the reach of macroethics principles can be constrained in relation to
competing values. Relational ethics thus embody countervailing constraints
that test and limit the operation of ethics regimes. “Relational ethics” may
not feel like ethics at all, insofar as it exerts a negative, limiting force on the
judicial ethics schema. But the boundaries of good and bad conduct that
judicial ethics seeks to delineate cannot be fully explained or justified without
recourse to relational ethics values—the dark energy of the judicial ethics
universe. The competing values that comprise relational ethics will be
elaborated upon with examples in Part II, but for purposes here, it is enough
to thumbnail the principal categories.

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. r. 1.3.
Id. r. 2.11.
Id. r. 2.4.
Id. r. 2.5.
Id.
Id. r. 2.8.
Id. r. 2.2.
Id. r. 1.2 (asterisks omitted).
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1. Guarding Against Constitutional Overreach
Ethics regulation is subject to constitutional constraints. Judges, like the
rest of us, enjoy First Amendment freedoms to speak and associate.73 At the
margins, the macroethics principles served by microethics rules that restrict
judicial speech and association must be weighed against the countervailing
rights of judges. In addition, judges who are subject to discipline for ethics
violations have a due process interest in rules that are written with sufficient
precision and clarity for them to know what the rules require so that judges
can avoid transgression.74 This interest in clarity and precision can conflict
with the need for microethics rules to be phrased broadly enough to
encompass and implement macroethics principles. Finally, microethics
regulations that legislatures seek to impose on judges can give rise to
separation of powers concerns that, even if never litigated, may exert leverage
as a countervailing relational interest in policy debates, when judges question
the constitutionality of legislation that they would be in a position to
invalidate as judges.
2. Encouraging Extrajudicial Engagement
Judges have an interest in pursuing their avocations by seeking out
educational opportunities, affiliating themselves with civic, charitable, and
fraternal organizations, teaching, writing, and speaking in public forums.
Codes of conduct encourage judges to be active as citizens in the communities
they serve as judges—activities that can make judges better-informed,
engaged, and empathic jurists.75 Microethics rules that offer contestable,
macroethics justifications for restricting such engagement—for example,
because participation in a given extrajudicial activity arguably calls a judge’s
impartiality into question—must be balanced against this competing interest.

Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949,
955 (1996) (“[L]ack of specificity as to what conduct makes a judge vulnerable to a charge of
appearance of impropriety raises serious due process concerns. Leaving the rules unidentified while
expecting them to be observed is bound to burden judges with uncertainty . . . .”).
75 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“A judge
should initiate and participate in community outreach activities for the purpose of promoting
public understanding of and confidence in the adminstration of justice.”); CHARLES GARDNER
GEYH, JAMES J. ALFINI & JAMES SAMPLE, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.02 (6th ed. 2020)
(discussing the importance and propriety of judges engaging with the outside world and
avoiding isolation).
73
74
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3. Promoting Operational Effectiveness
Judges have an institutional interest in the efficient and expeditious
operation of their courts.76 Ethics rules that burden court operations by
imposing restrictions on judicial conduct driven by macroethics rationales
that judges find dubious invite assessments of whether the ethics gains of a
given microethics rule justify the efficiency losses.
4. Preserving Institutional Legitimacy
The judiciary’s interest in preserving the institutional legitimacy of its
courts cuts both ways. Ethics regimes serve to promote public confidence in
the judiciary, but overly aggressive regulation can arguably have the opposite
effect by cultivating the misperception that unethical conduct is more
prevalent than it is.77
Note that this list of relational interests does not include simple selfinterest. Although judges may have an “interest” in taking bribes to pay for
their cabanas, or winning elections by any means necessary, naked selfinterest offers no normative heft for good judges to weigh in the balance
against macroethics values.78 To the contrary, microethics rules exist to
manage and control manifestations of judicial self-interest that are
antithetical to macroethics values. An ongoing challenge is to differentiate
legitimate relational interests (that can sometimes align with judicial selfinterest) from ersatz relational interests that operate as a shill.
In short, relational ethics pit the dictates of micro and macroethics against
competing priorities, to the end of delineating the boundaries of appropriate
ethics regulation. This is where the conversation takes a turn for the
Burbankian. In his work, Burbank has explored the tensions between judicial
independence and accountability in judicial oversight, and between law and
policy in judicial decisionmaking.79 He takes pains to emphasize that these
principles in tension are not opposites but are two sides of the same coin: the
76 For example, in the federal system, judicial misconduct under the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act is defined as conduct “prejudicial to effective and expeditious” court administration.
28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
77 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 890-91 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[Interpreting the Due Process Clause to require judicial disqualification for probable
bias] will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless
those charges may be. The end result will do far more to erode public confidence in judicial
impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a particular case.”).
78 The relational interest in extrajudicial engagement transcends self-interest because it is
concerned with forms of engagement that make judges better judges.
79 Burbank, supra note 1, at 339-40; see also Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors, supra
note 1717, at 41 (“[T]here is no dichotomy between law and judicial politics; they are complements,
each needing (or relying on) the other.”).
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appropriate limits of judicial independence are constrained by the need for
accountability; and in judicial decisionmaking, law constrains policy, while
policy informs law.80 They are thus not contradictory; rather, each informs
the other—and so it is with relational ethics. The competing priorities that
relational ethics introduce do not contradict but circumscribe the dictates of
micro and macroethics. They are complementary.
II. SITUATING ETHICS CONTROVERSIES IN THE ETHICS
ARCHITECTURE
Having described the tripartite architecture of judicial ethics, it is possible
to revisit the ethics controversies summarized in the introduction to this
Article and situate them in the context of that architecture. In so doing,
patterns emerge to reveal recurring pressure points in contemporary judicial
ethics analysis that pose a challenge to the future of ethics regulation.
The ethics controversies synopsized in the introduction arise when
putatively proper or improper judicial conduct comes to light that is allegedly
overregulated or underregulated. From there, the controversies have
proceeded along one of two tracks: 1) A general consensus emerges, either
that controversial judicial conduct is in tension with macroethics values,
underregulated by microethics rules, unjustified by countervailing relational
interests, and should be regulated as improper; or that the conduct in question
does not raise such concerns and should be deregulated or left be; 2) In the
absence of consensus, controversial remedial action that is taken or proposed
in response to putatively improper judicial conduct is resisted on the grounds
that the conduct is not sufficiently in tension with macroethics principles and
microethics rules to offset countervailing relational interests.
A. When Consensus Emerges on the Ethical Propriety of Controversial Conduct
Traditional judicial ethics controversies follow a well-worn path common
to law reform generally: an underregulated problem arises, is identified as
such, and is fixed. The birth and evolution of microethics regulation were
catalyzed by this kind of controversy: the Landis affair exposed the inability
of impeachment to address unethical conduct falling short of high crimes and
misdemeanors and led to the promulgation of the ABA Canons of Judicial
Ethics.81 Subsequent ethics scandals, in turn, highlighted the impotence of
80 Burbank, supra note 1, at 339-40; Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors, supra
note 17, at 51-58.
81 See The Landis Case, 7 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 87 (1921); About the Commission, Background Paper:
ABA Activities in Judicial Ethics, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/policy/judicial_code_revision_project/background [https://perma.cc/6QMN-2BSC].
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the hortatory Canons, and led to the promulgation of mandatory standards
of judicial conduct in the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct.
Among the recent ethics controversies summarized in the introduction,
the sexual harassment scandals in the federal judiciary fall into this traditional
category. The evolution of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct reflects
a growing awareness of and concern for the problem of sexual harassment in
the judiciary. The 1972 iteration made no mention of bias, prejudice, or
harassment;82 the 1990 Model included a black letter prohibition on judges
performing their duties with “bias or prejudice,” and added commentary
directing judges to avoid conduct “that could reasonably be perceived as
sexual harassment;”83 and the 2007 Model Code elevated the prohibition on
harassment to a black letter rule that explicitly forbade harassment based on
sex and gender.84 The Judicial Conference of the United States, however,
declined to amend its Code in light of either the 1990 or 2007 Models: the
canons themselves addressed neither gender bias nor harassment; rather, the
federal Code relegated the issue to a comment noting that the duty to be
“respectful,” included “the responsibility to avoid comment or behavior that
could reasonably be interpreted as harassment, prejudice or bias.”85
An antiquated Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges combined with rigid
confidentiality rules and complainant-unfriendly procedures resulted in
gender bias and sexual harassment going underreported and underinvestigated.86 Isolated episodes of sexual misconduct reached critical mass
82 MILORD, supra note 53, at 17-18 (noting that canons addressing bias and prejudice and
commentary addressing sexual harassment were “new” to the 1990 Code).
83 Id. at 18, 75.
84 See GEYH & HODES, supra note 62, at 28-29 (“The 1990 Code included nothing in the black
letter about harassment, . . . [but] [t]he Commission agreed that harassment was a form of bias or
prejudice that should be specifically proscribed by the Rules . . . [and so] deci[ded] to enshrine
harassment in the black letter . . . including sexual harassment.”).
85 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY pt. A, ch. 2, at 10 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICY], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9L4W-GB6A].
86 See generally Abbey Meller & Joy Bagwell, Sexual Harassment in the Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS: COURTS (Oct. 25, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/
news/2018/10/25/460038/sexual-harassment-judiciary [https://perma.cc/7S2S-WZLG] (discussing
the sexual assault allegations against Justice Brett Kavanaugh during his confirmation hearings and
the threat to women’s rights posed by former President Trump’s confirmation of largely male judges
to the federal judiciary); Joan Biskupic, CNN Investigation: Sexual Misconduct by Judges Kept Under
Wraps, CNN: POL. (Jan. 26, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/courtsjudges-sexual-harassment/index.html [https://perma.cc/WXF4-9MF6] (reporting on allegations
that the judiciary has obscured the extent of judicial misconduct); see also, e.g., Protecting Federal
Judiciary Employees from Sexual Harassment, Discrimination, and Other Workplace Misconduct: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
(2020) (testimony of Olivia Warren) (explaining the obstacles faced by a former federal law clerk in
reporting the sexual harassment she experienced); Dahlia Lithwick, He Made Us All Victims and
Accomplices, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/judge-alex-
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with multiple allegations against Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski and, ignited by
the Me Too movement, exploded into scandal. 87
In response to the scandal, the Judicial Conference established a Federal
Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group.88 The Working Group
undertook a review of its Code and complaint procedures, held hearings, and
issued an array of recommended changes (including Code amendments to
address sexual harassment) that the Judicial Conference adopted.89 In the
revised Code, the duty not to engage in harassment was elevated to the black
letter of Canon 3 itself as well as Canon 3B(4), and received multiple
mentions in commentary.90 The decision to regulate sexual harassment more
closely encountered no widespread opposition. Outlier judges, whose
insensitivity to the issue and its impact on the judiciary’s integrity and
legitimacy prompted reform, did not rise up to impede the effort.
This same template was followed in 2006, in response to allegations that
the Judicial Conference and the Circuit Judicial Councils were mishandling
and under enforcing complaints of ethical misconduct in disciplinary
proceedings. Congressional critics focused their ire on a complaint against
California District Judge Manuel Real that had been pending fitfully for

kozinski-made-us-all-victims-and-accomplices.html [https://perma.cc/HNG2-AWET] (describing
the problem with reference to the “worshipful” relationship between law clerks and their judges).
87 See generally Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual
Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/
1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/256L-RRDQ]; see also Matt
Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappropriate Behavior, Including Four Who
Say He Touched or Kissed Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nine-more-women-say-judge-subjected-them-to-inappropriate-behavior-includingfour-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them/2017/12/15/8729b736-e105-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7Q23-F9XD]; Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After
Sexual Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/
us/alex-kozinski-retires.html [https://perma.cc/9CFX-BAZL].
88 FED. JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING GRP., U.S. CTS., REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING GROUP TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2018).
89 I was among those asked to testify at these hearings. For details of the proposed changes,
see Proposed Changes to Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and Judicial Conduct and Disability Rules, U.S.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/proposed-changes-code-conduct-judgesjudicial-conduct-disability-rules [https://perma.cc/7EYG-2V4S]; FED. JUDICIARY WORKPLACE
CONDUCT WORKING GRP., supra note 88; Judicial Conference Approves Package of Workplace Conduct
Reforms, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2019/03/12/judicial-conferenceapproves-package-workplace-conduct-reforms [https://perma.cc/6XQH-82S9]. I testified on the
draft revisions at the Working Group’s invitation.
90 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY pt. A, ch. 2, at 4-5, 7, 10-11 (2019), https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_1
2_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E38A-6X2H].
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years.91 Congressional leaders introduced legislation to install an Inspector
General in the federal judiciary and initiate impeachment proceedings against
Judge Real.92 These controversial proposals (which, with the Inspector
General proposal, raised concerns that Congress was seeking to encroach on
the judiciary’s autonomy) effectively yielded to a consensus reform effort
spearheaded by a committee appointed by Chief Justice Roberts and chaired
by Justice Stephen Breyer.93 The Breyer Committee found systemic problems
with the procedures that the Judicial Conference and Circuit Judicial
Councils employed to investigate disciplinary complaints, and recommended
limited reforms that the Judicial Conference subsequently adopted.94
Legislation to establish an Inspector General was reintroduced in later
congresses but had lost momentum and was left to languish;95 the consensus
in favor of the Breyer Committee alternative, while rough and incomplete,
was nonetheless sufficient to block a reform deemed unnecessary to protect
the integrity of the judiciary and its disciplinary process.
B. When Consensus Fractures on the Ethical Propriety of Controversial Conduct
Most of the judicial ethics controversies highlighted in the introduction
do not follow the traditional, consensus-driven reform template. Rather,
recent ethics kerfuffles have tended to feature deep disagreement within the
ranks of the bench, bar, and academy on the propriety of the judicial conduct
at issue and the need for a regulatory response. These twenty-first century
scenarios highlight competing perspectives on whether controversial judicial
conduct is in tension with macroethics values, and the extent to which
relational ethics interests offset macroethics concerns.
Part I identified four relational interests that constrain the operation of
microethics rules as guided by macroethics values: guarding against
91 Henry Weinstein, Impeachment Inquiry of Judge Sought, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2006, 12:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-jul-18-me-real18-story.html [https://perma.cc/
V82Q-G3S4] (discussing then-House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.
(R-Wis.)’s efforts to look into the possible impeachment of Judge Manuel L. Real).
92 H.R. Res. 916, 109th Cong. (2006). I testified before the House Judiciary Committee in
opposition to the Inspector General proposal and in opposition to the impeachment of Judge Real.
93 See JUD. CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (2006)
[hereinafter BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT].
94 Id.; 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY pt. E, ch. 3 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICY], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial_conduct_and_disability_rules_
effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZE8-F53U] (Judicial Conference implementation of
Breyer Committee Report).
95 See generally Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2015, S. 1418, 114th Cong.
(2015); Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2017, S. 2195, 115th Cong. (2017).
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constitutional overreach; encouraging extrajudicial engagement; promoting
operational effectiveness; and preserving institutional legitimacy. This
Section explores how recent debates over these relational interests have
played out to the end of showing the ascendance of relational interests in the
regulation of judicial ethics, an emerging skepticism of the macroethics
rationales for microethics rules, and the obscuring of ethics analysis by
partisan divides and judicial self-interest. These developments have
manifested as a one-two punch, in which critics of a given microethics
proposal 1) challenge the macroethics justification for the measure, and 2)
argue that the marginalized justification for the measure is offset by one or
more relational interests.
1. Guarding Against Constitutional Overreach
This one-two punch is well-illustrated by episodes in which critics have
challenged microethics rules as unconstitutional. The twenty-first century
origin story for this form of relational challenge can be traced to the Supreme
Court’s 2002 decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.96 In White,
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a five-member majority, invalidated a
Canon in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited candidates
in judicial election campaigns from announcing their views on disputed legal
issues (the “Announce Clause”)—a Canon that the state of Minnesota argued
was necessary to preserve and promote judicial impartiality.97 The Court
opined that an ethics rule such as this, which imposed a content-based
restriction on fully protected speech, could survive constitutional scrutiny
only if it is was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state
interest.98 That set up the Court’s one-two punch: the Announce Clause, the
majority observed, “barely” furthered the state’s interest in impartiality
(because the clause was underinclusive, proscribing announcements during
but not before or after judicial campaigns), which rendered the macroethics
justification for the clause insufficiently muscular to offset the relational First
Amendment interest at stake.99
White emboldened judicial candidates to contest an array of additional
microethics restrictions on their speech, with varying degrees of success. In
another 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a rule that
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 788.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 776; see also id. at 777 n.7 (“[W]e are careful to say that the announce clause is ‘barely
tailored to serve that interest’ [in promoting impartiality]. . . . The question under our strict scrutiny
test, however, is not whether the announce clause serves this interest at all, but whether it is narrowly
tailored to serve this interest. It is not.”).
96
97
98
99
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forbade judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
contributions.100 Lower courts invalidated rules that barred judicial
candidates from making misleading campaign statements,101 struck down
rules that prohibited candidates from declaring their partisan affiliations,102
and were divided on whether ethics rules could prevent judicial candidates
from making pledges, promises or commitments,103 or engaging in other
forms of partisan, political campaign conduct.104
In the federal system, First Amendment claims have operated as a
relational ethics interest in less formal ways. In 2001, the Community Rights
Counsel published an exposé that accused federal judges of attending
expense-paid educational seminars at luxury resorts sponsored by
corporations with cases before the federal courts—seminars that allegedly
slanted seminar content in favor of the corporate sponsors’ positions in
litigation.105 Senators John Kerry and Russ Feingold introduced legislation to
prohibit these so-called “junkets for judges.”106 Federal judges who supported
the seminars were unsympathetic to the macroethics concern at issue,
dismissing claims that judges could be improperly influenced by educational

100 Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (“Unlike a politician, who is
expected to be appropriately responsive to the preferences of supporters, a judge in deciding cases
may not follow the preferences of his supporters or provide any special consideration to his
campaign donors.”).
101 See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[P]rohibiting false statements
negligently made . . . does not afford the requisite ‘breathing space’ [because] . . . ‘erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate . . . .’” (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60, 61 (1982)));
Winter v. Wolnitzek, 56 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (holding that a canon that prohibited
judicial candidates from making misleading statements violated the First Amendment).
102 See Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 689 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that canons cannot
prevent judges from campaigning as a member of a political party or making speeches for or against
a political organization or candidate); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (overturning a Minnesota partisan activities clause that prohibited judges and
judicial candidates from attending political gatherings and seeking, accepting, or using a political
organization’s endorsement).
103 Compare Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ind. 2009), aff ’d as modified, 620 F.3d
704 (7th Cir. 2010) (invalidating Indiana’s prohibition on pledges, promises, and commitments), with
Pa. Fam. Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (upholding Pennsylvania’s
“commits” clause).
104 See Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 978, 990 (7th Cir. 2010) (invalidating a rule that
directed judges and judicial candidates to “refrain from inappropriate political activity”).
105 Douglas T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars
Are Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s Trust, 25 H ARV . E NV ’ T
L. R EV . 405 (2001).
106 Judicial Education Reform Act of 2000, S. 2990, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Bruce A.
Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs? Should Judicial Education be
Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 942-43 (2002)
(discussing “Junkets for Judges” and the Kerry-Feingold bill).
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programs as foolish.107 In 2001, Chief Justice Rehnquist highlighted the
relational issue at stake, declaring bluntly that “[t]he approach of the KerryFeingold bill is antithetical to our American system and its tradition of
zealously protecting freedom of speech”108—a clear signal of how his Court
might review the legislation if it was passed and challenged. In 2004, the
Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct issued a revised ethics
advisory opinion urging judges to be mindful of the potential macroethics
concerns associated with attending such seminars and elaborating on the due
diligence judges should undertake before accepting invitations to attend.109
But deep fissures remained. Senator Feingold persisted in his efforts to enact
a bill to ban the seminars,110 and in 2010, a new dispute erupted over whether
federal judges could serve on the boards of private organizations hosting the
seminars—a dispute perpetuated and exacerbated by progressive
commentators who opposed the seminars and conservative commentators
who supported them.111
In 2016, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg criticized then presidential
candidate Donald Trump in multiple news outlets, most notably in an
interview with CNN in which she described him as a “faker,” adding that
“[h]e has no consistency about him. He says whatever comes into his head at
the moment. He really has an ego. . . . How has he gotten away with not
turning over his tax returns? The press seems to be very gentle with him on
that.”112 Reaction to Justice Ginsburg’s remarks from traditionalists was
107 A. Raymond Randolph, Private Judicial Seminars: A Reply to Abner Mikva, LITIGATION, Fall
2002, at 3, 6 (“[Judge Mivka] has unjustly attacked their honor and integrity.”).
108 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Law Institute’s Annual
Meeting 1 (May 14, 2001) (transcript available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeech/sp_05-14-01 [https://perma.cc/EFT8-JEUU]).
109 See Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 67: Attendance at
Independent Educational Seminars (2009) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 67] (“In determining
whether to attend and accept benefits associated with a particular seminar, a judge should be guided
by Canon 2 and should consider any consequent recusal obligation under Canon 3C(1).”) reprinted
in 2B GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY ch. 2, at 67-1, 67-2 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/vol02b-ch02-advisory67.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GR7-5RLC].
110 Brendan Smith, Judicial Seminars Derided As Junkets Under Scrutiny, BLT: BLOG
LEGALTIMES (Jan. 30, 2008, 4:20 PM), https://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2008/01/judicialsemina.html [https://perma.cc/P2MN-DNE4].
111 CAC Asks Three Federal Judges to Resign from FREE’s Board of Directors, Citing Ethics Opinion,
CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (Dec. 9, 2010), https://www.theusconstitution.org/blog/cac-asksthree-federal-judges-to-resign-from-frees-board-of-directors-citing-ethics-opinion [https://perma.cc/
48C5-6R4W] (arguing that judges commit ethical violations when attending partisan conferences);
Jonathan H. Adler, Junkets For Judges, NAT’L REV. (June 23, 2005, 11:55 AM), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2005/06/junkets-judges-jonathan-h-adler [https://perma.cc/UBY8-5PAY]
(arguing that CRC is misled in believing that seminars pose an ethical threat to judges).
112 Joan Biskupic, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Calls Trump a ‘Faker,’ He Says She Should Resign,
CNN: POLITICS (July 13, 2016, 7:45 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/politics/justice-ruthbader-ginsburg-donald-trump-faker/index.html [https://perma.cc/FQP2-A4MZ].
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largely negative. Her statements, they concluded, flouted the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 5(A)(2), which provided that “A judge
should not . . . publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office,” and
thrusted her into the partisan maelstrom unnecessarily, to the detriment of
public confidence in her impartiality.113 Although Supreme Court justices
were subject to neither the Code of Conduct nor a disciplinary process,
Justice Ginsburg promptly and publicly conceded error, expressed regret, and
vowed not to repeat the transgression.114
It would, however, be a mistake to characterize this as a consensus
resolution. In an op-ed, Professor Noah Feldman questioned the macroethics
rationale for condemning her public statements, arguing that “[n]othing in
the Constitution . . . demands that the justices be nonpartisan, or even
pretend to be” and that Justice Ginsburg should feel no need to perpetuate
the discredited myth of an apolitical and impartial Court.115 Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky, in turn, raised a countervailing relational interest, arguing that
silencing Justice Ginsburg was “inconsistent with one of the most basic
underlying principles of the 1st Amendment: that more speech is better in a
democracy because it leads to a better-informed population.”116
Chemerinsky’s focus on the relational, First Amendment value of judicial
speech, from the audience’s perspective, was likewise implicated by a
controversy surrounding Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas’
113 2014 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, supra note 85, pt. A, ch. 2, Canon 5; see also Laurence
H. Silberman, A ‘Notorious’ 2016 for Ginsburg and Comey, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:22 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-notorious-2016-for-ginsburg-and-comey-1487978570 [https://perma.cc/
6LKX-E3Y7]; Daniel W. Drezner, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Crossed Way, Way Over the Line,
WASH. POST (July 12, 2016, 9:11 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/
12/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-has-crossed-way-way-over-the-line [https://perma.cc/ZNX9-C5PM];
Rick Hasen, Do Justice Ginsburg’s Comments on Donald Trump Require Recusal in a Clinton v. Trump
Case?, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 10, 2016, 7:47 PM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=84177
[https://perma.cc/P8JG-8RWN].
114 See Robert Barnes, Ginsburg Expresses ‘Regret’ for Remarks Criticizing Trump, WASH. POST
(July 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ginsburg-expresses-regret-over-remarkscriticizing-trump/2016/07/14/f53687bc-49cc-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html [https://perma.cc/
97Y4-F6CE] (“On reflection, my recent remarks in response to press inquiries were ill-advised and
I regret making them. . . . Judges should avoid commenting on a candidate for public office. In the
future I will be more circumspect.” (Quoting Justice Ginsburg)).
115 Noah Feldman, It’s Fine for Supreme Court Justices to Speak Their Minds, BLOOMBERG: OP.
(July 12, 2016, 12:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-07-12/it-was-fine-forjustice-ginsburg-to-speak-her-mind [https://perma.cc/77NC-3WZ2].
116 Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed: Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Nothing to Apologize for in Her Criticism
of Donald Trump, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oechemerinsky-ginsburg-trump-comments-20160718-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/BG5M-Z56V]; see
also Dmitry Bam, Seen and Heard: A Defense of Judicial Speech, 11 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 765, 768-69
(2017); Paul Butler, Ginsburg Knows, If Trump Wins, the Rule of Law Is at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017,
5:44 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/12/can-a-supreme-court-justice-denounce-acandidate/ginsburg-knows-if-trump-wins-the-rule-of-law-is-at-risk [https://perma.cc/6LK9-K8Y5].
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appearances as featured speakers at Federalist Society events.117 Insofar as
those events were fundraisers, the appearances ran afoul of Canon 4C of the
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, which states that “a judge should not
personally participate in fund-raising activities,” and elaborates in
commentary that “[a] judge may attend fund-raising events . . . although the
judge may not be a speaker, a guest of honor, or featured on the program of
such an event.”118 That Code applied only to judges in the lower federal
courts, but the episode fueled arguments in support of legislation directing
the Supreme Court to establish such a code for itself.119 Defenders of Scalia
and Thomas, in contrast, trivialized the macroethics concern associated with
the speeches. Circuit Judge Laurence Silberman, for example, dismissed the
justices’ critics as “hypocrites pushing phony concerns.”120 Moreover, the
countervailing relational interest of audiences in hearing what judges had to
say, given the leadership role judges serve in the legal community, led the
ABA to revise its 2007 Model Code to authorize judges to appear at lawrelated fundraisers that the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges forbade.121
Some judicial ethics controversies have featured other constitutional
concerns, which critics have raised as relational interests to curb the reach of
given microethics measures. In state systems, the foundational ethics rule that
judges avoid the “appearance of impropriety” has been challenged with the
familiar two-stage attack, featuring a due process objection. First, critics have
taken aim at the macroethics justification for the rule, arguing that it serves
no useful purpose because it proceeds on the dubious premise that the
appearance of impropriety evidences actual impropriety, which enables
scurrilous court critics to make judges look bad as a way to insinuate that they
are bad; it fixates on perceived impropriety that distracts from a more sensible
focus on actual impropriety; and it makes actual impropriety more difficult
to detect and prevent by directing judges to avoid—and in practice, conceal—
perceived impropriety.122 Second, critics raised the relational ethics concern
117 See Rmuse, Justices Thomas and Scalia Violate Judicial Ethics By Headlining Right Wing
Fundraisers, POLITICUSUSA (Nov. 16, 2013), https://www.politicususa.com/2013/11/16/justices-thomasscalia-violate-judicial-ethics-headlining-wing-fundraisers.html [https://perma.cc/6AB3-VMTE].
118 2014 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, supra note 85, pt. A, ch. 2, at 12, 15-16.
119 See Andrew Rosenthal, Step Right Up. Buy Dinner With a Justice, N.Y. TIMES: OP. PAGES
(Nov. 10, 2011, 4:30 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/step-right-up-buydinner-with-a-justice [https://perma.cc/6FZL-JBE3].
120 Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight On Supreme Court Justices, NPR (Aug. 17, 2011, 12:01
AM), https://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139646573/bill-puts-ethics-spotlight-on-supreme-court-justices
[https://perma.cc/BQ84-RT94].
121 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 3.7(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007); GEYH & HODES,
supra note 62, at 70.
122 See Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 44
STAN. L. REV. 593 (1992); Alex Kozinski, The Appearance of Propriety, LEGAL AFFS., Jan.–Feb.
2005, at 19.

2021]

The Architecture of Judicial Ethics

2377

that holding judges accountable for an appearance of impropriety—that is to
say, for looking bad—is so vague a standard as to be meaningless, which, in
the context of a rule that subjects violators to discipline, encroaches on due
process.123 The ABA Commission charged with revising the most recent
overhaul of the Model Code initially relented to critics and moved the
admonition to avoid appearances of impropriety from the text of an
enforceable rule to an unenforceable, overarching canon (a glorified
caption).124 But the media excoriated the Commission, and the Conference
of Chief Justices—which regarded a rigorous appearance standard as essential
to preserving public confidence in the courts—warned that state judiciaries
would not approve a code that demoted the standard to the status of an
unenforceable principle.125 The ABA relented and restored the standard to
the status of an enforceable rule shortly before the Code was approved.126
In the federal system, Chief Justice Roberts has raised separation of
powers concerns as a gentle warning to Congress that its authority to impose
microethics measures on the federal courts may have relational limits. In his
2011 annual report, the Chief Justice noted that, in a spirit of comity, Supreme
Court justices complied with statutes imposing financial disclosure and
disqualification requirements, but that the constitutionality of those
requirements had never been tested.127 He made this observation in a report
that focused on a proposal for the Supreme Court to adopt its own Code of
Conduct.128 His commentary on the code proposal dwelled on what he
perceived to be a lack of macroethics need for the reform: the justices already
consulted the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and had no need for their
own code.129 Because Congress had yet to introduce legislation directing the
123 Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public
Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1919-20 (2010); Letter from Ronald Minkoff,
Chair, APRL Comm. on Model Code of Jud. Conduct, on behalf of the Ass’n of Pro. Resp. Laws.,
to the ABA Comm’n on the Model Code of Jud. Conduct (June 30, 2004) (available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/judicialet
hics/resources/comm_rules_minkoff_063004.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHU8-23NG]).
124 Adam Liptak, A.B.A. Panel Would Weaken Code Governing Judges’ Conduct, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/us/06aba.html [https://perma.cc/73NW-TTTY].
125 Id.; see also Editorial, Weakening the Rules for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A16;
PROFESSIONALISM & COMPETENCE OF THE BAR COMM., CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTS., OPPOSING
THE REPORT OF THE ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT IN LIGHT OF ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CANON ON
‘APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY’ (2007), https://ccj.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/23710/
02072007-opposing-report-aba-joint-commission-judicial-conduct-provide-enforceability.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NNU9-A9TQ].
126 GEYH & HODES, supra note 62, at 17-18.
127 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6-7 (2011), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ3K-SXMT].
128 Id. at 3-5.
129 Id.
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Court to establish such a code,130 the Chief Justice had no occasion to opine
on its constitutional status. But for close observers, his gratuitous reference
to the uncertain constitutionality of related statutes anticipated legislation
imposing a code on the Supreme Court and flagged the relational limits of
congressional power in advance, as a warning.131
2. Encouraging Extrajudicial Engagement
In some instances, microethics measures restricting extrajudicial activities
have been challenged on the grounds that the macroethics rationale for the
rule is offset by a countervailing relational interest in exposing judges to
experiences and ideas that make them better-informed and engaged jurists.
Professors Alfini, Sample, and I explain the relationship between extrajudicial
engagement and the judicial role in the introduction to our treatise on judicial
conduct and ethics:
It is frequently said that impartial judges should be neutral and
detached, but this does not mean that judges have to isolate themselves . . . .
[T]o place judges in a monastery or an ivory tower would diminish their
judicial ability. . . . Involvement in the outside world enriches the judicial
temperament and enhances a judge’s ability to make difficult decisions. As
Justice Holmes once said: “[T]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”132

At the margins, this relational interest in exposing judges to ideas and
experiences that inform their perspectives and judgments can push back
against concerns that such exposure threatens judicial impartiality, integrity,
or independence.
In 2020, a draft ethics advisory opinion addressing whether it was proper
for federal judges to be members of the American Constitution Society
(ACS), the Federalist Society, and the American Bar Association (ABA) was
circulated to other federal judges by the Judicial Conference Committee on
Codes of Conduct and leaked to the public.133 The draft noted that the
Federalist Society “describes itself as ‘a group of conservatives and
libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order,’” while the
American Constitution Society “describes itself as a ‘progressive legal
Cf. Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2013, S. 1424, 113th Cong. (2013).
Cf. KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10255, A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE
SUPREME COURT? LEGAL QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 3 (2019).
132 GEYH ET AL., supra note 75, § 1.02.
133 Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 117: Judges’ Involvement With
the American Constitution Society, the Federalist Society, and the American Bar Association (Jan.
2020) (exposure draft) (available at http://eppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Guide-Vol02BCh02-AdvOp11720OGC-ETH-2020-01-20-EXP-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS56-SKHP]).
130
131
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organization,’” and concluded that it eroded public confidence in judicial
impartiality for judges to be members of organizations dedicated to such
ideologically aligned causes.134 In contrast, the draft offered cautious approval
for ABA membership, opining that the ABA’s mission, “unlike that of the
ACS or the Federalist Society, is concerned with the improvement of the law
in general and advocacy for the legal profession as a whole,” and that while
the ABA House of Delegates sometimes advocated for individual policy
agendas, such advocacy was “ancillary to the ABA’s core, neutral, and
appropriate” objectives.135 Controversy erupted when conservative judges
and commentators took issue with the draft’s recommendations relating to
the Federalist Society and the ABA.136 A letter signed by over 200 federal
judges argued at length that the Committee’s macroethics justification for
prohibiting membership in the Federalist Society was overblown, while the
Committee’s diminished concern for ABA membership reflected a “double
standard.”137 Featured prominently on the first page of their eight-page letter
was the corresponding, relational ethics follow-through: “[t]he Judicial Code
of Conduct urges that judges ‘not become isolated from the society in which
[we] live[],’” the letter observed, adding that “[w]e are all better served when
judges expose themselves to a wide array of legal ideas.”138
The “junkets for judges” imbroglio, in which interest groups lobbied to
stop federal judges from attending expense-paid seminars sponsored by
corporations with an interest in cases pending in the federal courts, was
previously highlighted as an episode in which judges, resistant to reform,
argued that the First Amendment freedom of speech operated as a relational
interest that offset the macroethics concerns at issue.139 But a second
relational interest in encouraging extrajudicial engagement was also in play.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 11. I was among the signatories of a letter from judicial ethics scholars in support of
the Committee’s draft conclusions.
136 See Jess Bravin, Justice Clarence Thomas Questions Proposal to Bar Judges From Membership in
Ideological Groups, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justiceclarence-thomas-questions-proposal-to-bar-judges-from-membership-in-ideological-groups11580664462?mg=prod/com-wsj [https://perma.cc/D9AV-7NVE]; Ed Whelan, Draft Judicial Ethics
Opinion Favors ABA Over Federalist Society and ACS, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 21, 2020, 2:47 PM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/draft-judicial-ethics-opinion-favors-aba-overfederalist-society-and-acs [https://perma.cc/Q653-U8DZ]; Ed. Bd., Judicial Political Mischief, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2020, 7:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judicial-political-mischief11579652574?st=n9h48xzggtrrt0u [https://perma.cc/N9G2-U8XG]; Ed. Bd., Judicial Code of
Misconduct, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judicial-code-ofmisconduct-11588721293 [https://perma.cc/29FM-7NNQ].
137 Letter from Fed. Judges to Robert P. Deyling, Assistant Gen. Couns., Admin. Off. of the U.S.
Cts. 1 (Mar. 18, 2020), https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/ResponsetoAdvisoryOpinion117.
pdf?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/Z98X-MEG9].
138 Id. at 1.
139 See supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text.
134
135
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In a spirited defense of the seminars, Circuit Judge A. Raymond Randolph
devoted most of his attention to disputing the macroethics rationale for
prohibiting judges from attending the educational programs, arguing that
attendance did not give rise to an appearance of impropriety.140 But he began
his critique with the observation that “[i]t is well known that education is
good for lawyers. It is less well known that education is also good for
judges.”141 Later, he quoted an excerpt from Judicial Conference Advisory
Opinion 67 for the proposition that “[t]he education of judges in various
academic disciplines serves the public interest,” adding that the statement
“should be enshrined in the hall of wisdom.”142 In a like vein, George Mason
University’s Law and Economics Center, which hosted many of the seminars at
issue, justified its role with the explanation that “fundamental principles of a
free and just society depend on a knowledgable and well educated judiciary.”143
3. Promoting Operational Effectiveness
By their nature, microethics rules direct judges to do or not to do things
that are, respectively, compatible or incompatible with macroethics
principles. When requiring judges to take the putatively ethical highroad
impedes court operations, it begs the question of whether and when ethics
gains are offset by operational losses.
Nowhere is this relational interest in operational effectiveness on more
prominent display than in the context of disputes over judicial
disqualification. The tension between disqualification and operational
effectiveness is, to some extent, baked into microethics rules themselves. The
Model Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to disqualify themselves when
their “impartiality[] might reasonably be questioned.”144 At the same time,
the Code admonishes judges to “hear and decide matters assigned to the
judge, except when disqualification is required,”145 because “respect for [the]
fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that may
be imposed upon the judge’s colleagues” require that a judge avoid
“[u]nwarranted disqualification.”146
Disputes over when the need for judicial disqualification should yield to
the relational interest of operational effectiveness litter the landscape of
Randolph, supra note 107, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5 (quoting Advisory Opinion No. 67, supra note 109, at 67-1).
Judicial Education Program, LAW & ECON. CTR., https://masonlec.org/divisions/masonjudicial-education-program [https://perma.cc/KZ4R-DA7Y].
144 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) (directing the same).
145 Id. r. 2.7.
146 Id. r. 2.7 cmt.
140
141
142
143
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disputes summarized in the introduction.147 For judges resistant to
disqualification, a first and by now-familiar step in the analysis is to contest
the macroethics need to withdraw pursuant to the microethics disqualification
rule. In Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., for example, West Virginia Justice Brent
Benjamin refused to disqualify himself on the grounds that he was not
actually biased in the defendant’s favor, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant’s CEO had spent $3 million in support of Benjamin’s election while
the appeal was pending.148 In a 5–4 ruling, the Court held that whether
Benjamin was subjectively biased was not necessary to determine; his failure
to disqualify despite an objective probability of bias was enough to violate the
plaintiff ’s due process rights.149 Similarly, in Williams v. Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania Justice Ronald Castille declined to disqualify himself from a
case in which, prior to ascending the bench, he had been the district attorney
who authorized the state to seek the death penalty against the defendant.150
Castille defended his non-disqualification on the grounds that his role in the
underlying prosecution was limited, but the Supreme Court concluded that
Castille had presided despite probable bias and thereby deprived Williams of
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.151
In other settings, disqualification-related disputes have paired skepticism
of the macroethics need for a more muscular disqualification response with a
countervailing, relational interest in operational effectiveness of the courts
that is putatively undermined by a shortfall of judges resulting from
aggressive disqualification requirements. In a high-profile case, Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia flew to Louisiana on Airforce 2 with Vice
President Dick Cheney for a weekend of duck hunting while Cheney was the
named defendant in a case pending before the Supreme Court.152 Justice
Scalia declined to disqualify himself.153 First, he challenged the macroethics
need for disqualification: his impartiality could not reasonably be questioned
under the federal disqualification statute because, since the nation was
147 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. A judge’s duty to disqualify when she is less
than impartial or reasonably perceived to be so is ensconced as an ethics rule in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct that every state and federal judicial system has adopted in one form or another. See
generally ABA Jud. Disqualification Project, Taking Judicial Disqualification Seriously, 92 JUDICATURE
12 (2008). In addition to being an ethical duty imposed on judges, disqualification is a means to
enforce the procedural right of litigants to an impartial judge pursuant to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment or procedural statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 455. CHARLES GARDNER
GEYH, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 2 (3d ed. 2020) (discussing
ethical and procedural dimensions of disqualification).
148 556 U.S. 868, 872-73 (2009).
149 Id. at 886.
150 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016).
151 Id. at 1907.
152 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 914-15 (2004).
153 Id.
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founded, Supreme Court justices had fraternized with public officials in the
political branches who would have business before the Court.154 He also
contended that disqualification was unwarranted because Cheney was being
sued in his official, not personal, capacity.155 In rejecting the argument that
the macroethics need to preserve the appearance of impartiality argued in
favor of him erring on the side of caution and self-disqualifying, Scalia
conceded the possible wisdom of such an approach for lower court judges, but
concluded that in his case, a relational interest in the operational effectiveness
of the Supreme Court, and avoiding 4–4 votes, offset such concerns.156
Implicit in the Scalia episode is one whopper of an irony that underscores
the extent to which relational ethics have trumped macroethics in the context
of judicial disqualification. The original disqualification rule, embedded in
English common law since the seventeenth century157 and entrenched in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence since the 1920s,158 is that no
judge may preside over his own case. And yet, when a litigant claims that her
presiding judge is less than impartial, the norm across state and federal
systems remains that the judge who is to decide that claim is the very judge
whose impartiality is being challenged.159 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
defend such a norm in macroethics terms, except to argue that most
disqualification requests are groundless, and rooted in a party’s strategic
desire to avoid a judge who, though not demonstrably partial, is unlikely to
be supportive on the merits. And so the heavy lifting is done by the relational
argument that transferring disqualification requests to a different judge would
impose excessive operational burdens on court systems.160 Efforts to side-step
the irony of calling upon judges to grade their own homework by enabling
parties to exercise a one-time right to automatic substitution of judges (akin

Id. at 916-17.
See id. (listing prior justices and executive officials who were friends to emphasize that a
“no-friends” rule has no grounding in historic practice).
156 Id. at 916.
157 See Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (K.B.).
158 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927) (“[I]t is very clear that the slightest pecuniary
interest of any officer, judicial or quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter which he was
to decide, rendered the decision voidable.”).
159 See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal,
53 KAN. L. REV. 531, 583-84 (2005) (pointing out that the norm is for the challenged judge to make
the ruling on a recusal motion, even though the law would permit the challenged judge to pass the
motion to an objective judge).
160 See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected
Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 531 (2007) (“[W]hile independent
adjudication of recusal motions does raise efficiency costs, those costs should not be substantial if
decisions are based on written affidavits and oral argument, rather than full-blown adversarial
hearings. The increased procedural integrity and public trust fostered by an independent decisionmaker may be well worth the price.”).
154
155

2021]

The Architecture of Judicial Ethics

2383

to a peremptory challenge) have encountered a similar fate.161 Such proposals
have been resisted by judges in jurisdictions that do not already have those
mechanisms in place, on the grounds that they too would impose significant
operational burdens on court systems, particularly in rural areas.162
The fate of the long-suffering American Bar Association Judicial
Disqualification Project underscores the triumph of the relational interest in
operational efficiency over macroethics principles. The project was
inaugurated in 2007.163 In its first phase, a discussion draft focused its
recommendations on disqualification procedure, and urged states to move
away from their traditional reliance on judicial self-disqualification. The draft
was quietly withdrawn following objections from the ABA Judicial
Division.164 Then, in its second phase, the initiative shifted toward revising
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in the aftermath of Caperton to address
the circumstances in which judges must disqualify themselves from cases
when parties or lawyers had sponsored independent campaigns in support of
the judge’s election.165 Once again, the Judicial Division objected, effectively
killing the project, in a manner consistent with the by-now familiar one-two
punch. First, the judges sought to minimize the macroethics concern, arguing
that the reform was ill-suited for the Model Code because it involved the
conduct of others beyond the judges’ control and was better regulated as a
matter of procedure, not ethics.166 This objection, which the Chair of the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility dismissed as
“stonewalling,”167 was difficult to reconcile with the existing Model Code,
which already imposed an ethical duty on judges to disqualify themselves for
direct campaign contributions from parties or lawyers in excess of amounts
that individual states specify.168 Second, the Judicial Division expressed the

161 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671,
683-84 (2011) (summarizing 28 U.S.C. § 144, which allows parties to secure disqualification of a
judge by presenting an affidavit that the judge is biased or prejudiced; the courts eventually made
this statute obsolete by imposing onerous requirements related to the affidavit).
162 ”Judicial Transparency and Ethics”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., & the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 7 (2017) (testimony of Charles G. Geyh, John
F. Kimberling Professor of L., Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of L.).
163 ABA Jud. Disqualification Project, supra note 147, at 12. I was the director of and consultant
to the project in its first phase.
164 Geyh, supra note 161, at 727-28.
165 Charles Geyh, Myles Lynk, Robert S. Peck & Toni Clarke, The State of Recusal Reform, 18
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 520 (2015).
166 Id. at 525-26, 530.
167 Id. at 525.
168 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(4) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2007).
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relational concern that requiring judges to disqualify themselves for the
campaign support they received would burden the judicial workforce.169
4. Preserving Institutional Legitimacy
When an institution exposes and addresses bad behavior within its ranks
in a forthright and transparent way, it sends a mixed message. On the one
hand, the institution shows that it is serious about keeping its house in order
and fixing its problems. On the other hand, the institution conveys the
impression that it has serious problems in need of fixing. If the goal is to
preserve public confidence in the institution, an overly aggressive response to
a problem can be counterproductive insofar as it creates the misperception
that the institution is more troubled than it is. When it comes to judicial
ethics and their regulation, then, the need to remedy macroethics problems
with microethics rules is tempered by a relational ethics interest in assuring
that the cure is proportionate to the disease—that enforcement of a given rule
achieves a net gain for the judiciary’s institutional legitimacy.
The controversy at the core of the Caperton case is illustrative.170 In that
case, a slender majority of the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that litigants
enjoyed a due process right to disqualify state judges who exhibited probable
bias. In so holding, the Court was mindful of the concern that its decision
could open the floodgates to litigants challenging judges’ impartiality at every
turn and took pains to emphasize how rarely its holding would come into
play.171 The Chief Justice, writing for four dissenters, was unpersuaded. In his
view, judges were entitled to a presumption of legitimacy: “All judges take an
oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust
that they will live up to this promise.”172 In Roberts’ view, a microethics rule
(of constitutional dimension, no less) that authorized due process challenges
to a judge’s impartiality would not promote the judiciary’s legitimacy, as
intended, but undermine it, because the rule would “inevitably lead to an
increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those
charges may be. The end result [would] do far more to erode public
confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a
169 Geyh et al., supra note 165, at 540 (noting practical concerns such as cost, lost time, and
finding a new judge to preside over a matter when judges must recuse themselves from a case).
170 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
171 Id. at 887 (“Our decision today addresses an extraordinary situation where the Constitution
requires recusal. . . . The facts now before us are extreme by any measure. The parties point to no
other instance involving judicial campaign contributions that presents a potential for bias
comparable to the circumstances in this case.”).
172 Id. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 891-92 (stating that the Due Process
Clause requires disqualification of a judge in only two situations: when the judge has a financial
interest in the case and when the judge is presiding over certain types of criminal contempt matters).
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particular case.”173 Ultimately, for Roberts, this was a case in which “the cure
[was] worse than the disease,” because “opening the door to recusal claims under
the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous ‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring
our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of
the American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.”174
III. THE LESSONS OF ETHICS CONTROVERSIES AND THE FUTURE OF
REFORM
Part I of this Article conceptualizes the inherent tension between
microethics rules guided by macroethics principles on the one hand, and
countervailing, relational ethics interests on the other, as two sides of the
same coin—in the spirit of the two-sided coin that Professor Burbank used
to characterize the relationship between judicial independence and
accountability. The scope of judicial independence is delineated by the
contours of the stamp on its own side of the coin (circumscribed, for example,
by the purposes judicial independence serves) and constrained by the needs
of accountability on the reverse side of the coin. In a like vein, microethics
rules are contoured by macroethics principles on one side of the judicial ethics
coin and constrained by relational ethics interests on the other.
Part II underscores the extent to which recent developments reveal
deepening disagreements over the balance to be struck between the two sides
of the judicial ethics coin. The traditional reform template—in which
problems arise, a consensus on the need for reform emerges, and reform
follows (or not, if the consensus is against the need for reform)—fails to
describe many recent ethics controversies. The traditional, consensus-driven
reform template relies on a shared understanding of how problematic conduct
implicates macroethics values and should be regulated by microethics rules in
light of offsetting relational interests. In the twenty-first century, this shared
understanding has proved elusive. With increasing frequency, ethics
controversies have generated fractious disagreement within the judiciary and
the legal profession, over whether microethics rule reform is warranted by a
demonstrable macroethics need, and whether that need, sapped of its strength
by divisive attack, is offset by countervailing relational interests.
There are several explanations for why consensus has become harder to
achieve. First, partisan and ideological divisions—which have dominated
public debates over federal judicial appointments, state judicial elections, and
judicial decisionmaking—have wormed their way into discussions of judicial
ethics. The ethics controversies embedded in the 2018 confirmation
173
174

Id. at 891.
Id. at 902.
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proceedings of Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh offer a powerful
example. As a Supreme Court nominee, Circuit Judge Kavanaugh was the
subject of two allegations with ethics implications. The first allegation was
that as a high school student he committed sexual assault, which, his critics
contended, reflected so badly on his integrity and character as to disqualify
him from service on the Supreme Court.175 The second allegation, supported
in a letter signed by over 2,400 law professors, was that when Kavanaugh took
the witness stand and denied the sexual assault allegations, he attacked his
Senate accusers with such partisan venom as to impugn his temperament to
serve as a Justice.176 While Kavanaugh’s nomination was pending and he
remained a circuit judge, a flurry of disciplinary complaints related to these
allegations were filed against the judge. The complaints were transferred to a
circuit judicial council that dismissed them for (in effect) lack of jurisdiction
after Kavanaugh was confirmed to the Supreme Court, but not before
characterizing the allegations as “serious.”177 Whether Kavanaugh committed
the assault; whether, if he did, the assault disqualified him from service on
the Court; and whether his testimony displayed an unacceptable lack of
judicial temperament divided along partisan lines. The split was reflected in
both the Senate vote and public opinion surveys.178
Ideological and partisan divides have exacerbated many of the ethics
controversies mentioned elsewhere in this Article. While Justice Ginsburg’s
public criticism of Donald Trump was questioned by traditionalists across the
175 See Benjamin Wittes, I Know Brett Kavanaugh, but I Wouldn’t Confirm Him, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/why-i-wouldnt-confirm-brett-kavanaugh/
571936 [https://perma.cc/3JUP-96KZ] (opposing Kavanaugh because of sexual assault allegations);
Emily Stewart, Support for Brett Kavanaugh is Dwindling Among Voters Amid Sexual Assault Allegations,
VOX (Sept. 23, 2018, 10:43 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/9/23/17892530/brettkavanaugh-confirmation-poll-christine-blasey-ford [https://perma.cc/5JQ2-ZW46] (discussing
opposition to Kavanaugh due to sexual assault allegations).
176 Wittes, supra note 175; Letter from 2,400+ Law Professors to the U.S. Senate (Oct. 4, 2018)
(available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/03/opinion/kavanaugh-law-professorsletter.html [https://perma.cc/R9Z7-ZNJP]) (“We have differing views about the other qualifications
of Judge Kavanaugh. But we are united, as professors of law and scholars of judicial institutions, in
believing that he did not display the impartiality and judicial temperament requisite to sit on the
highest court of our land.”). I was among the signatories on the letter.
177 See Order at 9 (Jud. Couns. of the 10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/
courts/ca10/10-18-90038-et-al.O.pdf [https://perma.cc/38XL-KPRU] (“The allegations contained in
the complaints are serious, but the Judicial Council is obligated to adhere to the Act. Lacking
statutory authority to do anything more, the complaints must be dismissed because an intervening
event—Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation to the Supreme Court—has made the complaints no longer
appropriate for consideration under the Act.”).
178 See Steven Shepard, Poll: Kavanaugh Support Falls Along Party Lines, POLITICO (Sept. 4,
2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/04/kavanaugh-confirmation-support-poll806300 [https://perma.cc/6G9S-5U9S] (“Among Republican voters, two-thirds, 67 percent, support
confirming Kavanaugh . . . . A majority of Democratic voters, 53 percent, say the Senate shouldn’t
confirm Kavanaugh . . . .”).
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political spectrum, her most fervent critics and defenders divided along
ideological lines.179 Judicial participation in expense-paid seminars—hosted
by ideologically conservative organizations—has been defended by
conservatives and attacked by liberals.180 The draft ethics advisory opinion
that recommended against judges being members of the conservative
Federalist Society was opposed by a cohort of largely Republican-appointed
judges.181 Objections to conservative Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas serving as featured speakers at Federalist Society fundraisers were
voiced by liberal-leaning interest groups.182 Public calls for the
disqualification of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia from the Cheney case
were led by liberal commentators, while public calls for the disqualification
of liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg over her criticism of Donald Trump
were led by conservative commentators.183 Similarly, in the months preceding
179 Examples of liberal-leaning commentators who defended Ginsburg’s statements include
Noah Feldman and Erwin Chemerinsky. Feldman, supra note 115 (“[There is] nothing wrong with a
sitting Supreme Court justice expressing her personal political views when they don’t implicate any
case that’s currently before the court.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Justices Have Free Speech Rights Too,
N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016, 3:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/12/can-asupreme-court-justice-denounce-a-candidate/justices-have-free-speech-rights-too [https://perma.cc/
UNF3-UEGA] (“The judicial code of ethics says that judges are not to endorse or oppose candidates
for elected office. But these provisions do not apply to Supreme Court justices. Nor do I believe
that such restrictions are constitutional or desirable.”). Examples of conservative-leaning
commentators who criticized Ginsburg’s statements include Ed Whelan and Laurence Silberman.
Aaron Blake, In Bashing Donald Trump, Some Say Ruth Bader Ginsburg Just Crossed a Very Important
Line, WASH. POST (July 11, 2016, 12:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/07/11/in-bashing-donald-trump-some-say-ruth-bader-ginsburg-just-crossed-a-very-importantline [https://perma.cc/3GLS-VHNG] (quoting Ed Whelen who remarked that Ginsburg’s
comments here “exceed[ed] [her previous public comments] in terms of her indiscretions”);
Silberman, supra note 113 (“[Justice Ginsburg] reached her low point in a stunning interview last
summer in the New York Times (where else?). Her comments were as openly political as any justice
has been in my memory—perhaps ever . . . .”).
180 Brendan Smith, Judicial Seminars Derided As Junkets Under Scrutiny, BLT: BLOG
LEGALTIMES (Jan. 30, 2008, 4:20 PM), https://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2008/01/judicialsemina.html [https://perma.cc/P2MN-DNE4] (quoting the liberal leaning Community Rights
Counsel in opposition to the seminars, and the libertarian organization, Foundation for Research in
Economics and the Environment, in defense of them).
181 See Caroline Fredrickson & Eric J. Segall, Trump Judges or Federalist Judges? Try Both, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/opinion/trump-judges-federalistsociety.html [https://perma.cc/PQ5B-CRHA] (describing how over 200 federal judges, nearly a
quarter of the federal judiciary, wrote to oppose the idea that judges should not be a part of the
Federalist Society).
182 See Alliance for Justice, A Question of Integrity: Politics, Ethics, and the Supreme Court,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GMoawSfR-No [https://
perma.cc/QX3J-TBAY] (criticizing Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas for speaking at Federalist
Society fundraisers).
183 See Mark Sherman, Ginsburg Apologizes for “Ill-Advised” Criticism of Trump, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (July 14, 2016), https://apnews.com/9258b1e65517469fa0b011f1cb532a8e [https://perma.cc/
72X7-TRFB] (“Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnel of Kentucky . . . called Ginsburg’s
remarks ‘totally inappropriate,’ . . . [and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley, R-
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Supreme Court review of the Obama administration’s Affordable Care Act,
conservative commentators demanded the disqualification of liberal Justice
Elena Kagan because of her comments on the legislation when she was
President Obama’s Solicitor General, while liberal commentators demanded
the disqualification of conservative Justice Clarence Thomas because of his
spouse’s work for an organization opposed to the Affordable Care Act.184
A second explanation for escalating discord in the ethics arena relates to
the first: over the course of the past century, a heightened fixation on judicial
politics has bred burgeoning skepticism of an impartial judiciary. Empirical
studies that document the influence of ideology on the decisionmaking of
federal judges generally, and Supreme Court justices in particular, have been
echoed in media reports and internalized by the general public in ways that
threaten to relegate the unbiased, open-minded judge to the status of myth.185
A natural consequence of this development is to second-guess, as naïve or
hypocritical, rules aimed at regulating the appearance of impartiality
generally—or specifically—in the context of prohibitions on judges speaking
their minds, affiliating with ideologically aligned organizations, or attending
expense-paid seminars.
Third, some of the recent pressure points in judicial ethics have been
exacerbated by judicial self-interest. When judges unite in opposition to
proposed legislation restricting their autonomy—for example, when the
Judicial Conference of the United States has opposed bills to establish an
Iowa said] ‘[s]he oughta stay out of it. . . . It hurts the court when she does that.’”); Opinion: Justice
Scalia and Mr. Cheney, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/28/opinion/
justice-scalia-and-mr-cheney.html [https://perma.cc/PNG9-YYKU] (“By vacationing in a small
group with Mr. Cheney and taking things of value, Justice Scalia created an appearance of bias
in Mr. Cheney’s favor. . . . Recusal rules protect not only litigants, but also the court itself. . . .
If Justice Scalia stays on the case and votes in Mr. Cheney’s favor, the court will no doubt face
more criticism. Justice Scalia should recuse himself, either of his own volition or with
encouragement of his colleagues.”).
184 Lamar Smith, a Republican representative from Texas, said: “The NFL wouldn’t allow a
team to officiate its own game. If, as solicitor general, Kagan did advise administration officials on
the constitutionality of the president’s health-care law, she should not officiate when the matter
comes before the Supreme Court.” Lamar Smith, The White House Needs to Come Clean on Elena
Kagan and the Affordable Care Act, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/the-white-house-needs-to-come-clean-on-elena-kagan-and-the-affordable-care-act/2011/
11/30/gIQAUUOPIO_story.html [https://perma.cc/VP67-L45M]; see also Michael O’Brien,
Democrats: Justice Thomas Should Recuse Himself in Healthcare Reform Case, THE HILL (Feb. 9, 2011,
4:10 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/142969-democrats-justice-thomasshould-recuse-himself-in-healthcare-reform-case [https://perma.cc/9Y4G-QDQJ] (“A group of 73
House Democrats on Wednesday demanded U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas recuse
himself from any case examining the constitutionality of healthcare reform . . . citing the work by
Thomas’s wife on behalf of efforts opposing that healthcare law.”).
185 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 115 (“The arguments against Ginsburg’s candor almost all come
down to the idea that she should have respected propriety and upheld the myth of judicial neutrality.
But who, exactly, believes in that myth in the year 2016?”).
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Inspector General in the federal judiciary—principled-seeming objections
grounded in separation of powers and judicial independence can converge
with self-interested desires to avoid accountability. Similarly, when judges
and judiciaries oppose proposals because their implementation would impose
additional workload burdens (such as proposals to assign disqualification
requests to a different judge), differentiating high-minded concern for the
judiciary’s operational effectiveness from a lowbrow desire to maximize
leisure time can be difficult.
When judges disagree among themselves on the wisdom of a proposed
ethics reform, self-interest may likewise play a role, insofar as those who
object are those whose ox is being gored. To some extent, the point is so
obvious as to be banal: some judges may oppose proposals to ban “junkets for
judges” because they want in on the junkets, while some judges may oppose
proposals to ban membership in the Federalist Society because they want to
be members of the Federalist Society. But self-interest can also operate in
subtler ways. Take, for example, the controversy surrounding first
amendment challenges to state judicial campaign ethics rules. As it turns out,
White and its offspring have not changed the character of judicial campaigns
to a measurable extent.186 State judges, it would seem, have declined to
embrace the ethos of White and have not taken to trumpeting their views on
legal issues from the campaign stump in game-changing ways. It is possible
to explain this non-development as principled: judges do not announce their
views from the campaign stump because their relational “right” to do so is
offset by a deeply entrenched, macroethics norm that such announcements
are antithetical to preserving their impartiality (the Supreme Court’s holding
to the contrary notwithstanding).187 It is, however, at least as easy to explain
this development in terms of judicial self-interest: incumbent judges enjoy
an electoral advantage that is preserved by avoiding controversies created by
airing their views, which may be why, with rare exception, it has been
challengers, not incumbents, who have sought to invalidate microethics

186 See Chris W. Bonneau, Melinda Gann Hall & Matthew J. Streb, White Noise: The Unrealized
Effects of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White on Judicial Elections, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 247, 247 (2011)
(“Our primary assumption is that if White has had the presumed effects, we should see measurable
changes in key judicial election characteristics: an increased willingness of challengers to enter the
electoral arena, decreased electoral support for incumbents, elevated costs of campaigns, and
declines in voter participation. Overall, we find no statistically discernable changes in state supreme
court or state intermediate appellate court elections on these dimensions . . . .”).
187 Justice Scalia, for example, belittled the claim that the announce clause promoted judicial
impartiality in his capacity as the opinion writer in White. Judge Scalia, however, in his capacity as
a Supreme Court candidate, declined to announce his views to the Senate Judiciary Committee on
the grounds that doing so would compromise his impartiality. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial
Elections Stink, 64 OHIO STATE L.J. 43, 66-67 (2003).
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restrictions on their campaign speech.188 Challengers, in turn, can fairly be
accused of harboring a self-interested desire to win by any means necessary,
most noticeably in the context of cases where they have sought to invalidate
rules that restrict their “right” to make misleading campaign statements.189
The varied explanations for eroding intra-judicial consensus on ethics
controversies can be synthesized: the judiciary is becoming a more political
place that holds increasingly divergent perspectives on when regulation is
needed to preserve public confidence in the judiciary’s impartiality, integrity,
and independence—divergences that widen the spaces for relational, partisan,
and self-interests to operate. The task of managing these divergences to the
end of preserving intra-judicial consensus on ethics norms is further
complicated by the fact that the judiciary is a bigger, busier, and less
homogeneous place than it was half a century ago.190
It is tempting to overburden the two-sided coin metaphor and sound an
alarm that the judicial ethics coin is out of balance—that because consensus on
when microethics rules are adequately supported by macroethics need has begun
to wear thin, the coin is increasingly weighted toward relational interests. But
thinking about the problem in this way is wrongheaded for two reasons.
First, such an approach implies that when it comes to the judicial ethics
coin, there is some transcendental, “true” balance in which the forces in
tension are equally weighted. That, in turn, invites naïve solutions aimed at
returning us to an earlier and simpler time when judicial politics was
disavowed, public perception of macroethics values was less jaded, and
relational ethics were less influential. For better or worse, however, the
toothpaste of legal realism cannot be returned to its tube, and disagreements
over the scope of macroethics values and the corresponding need for
microethics regulation are likely to persist into the foreseeable future.
Second, this Article’s focus on heightened disagreement over the
macroethics need for proposed microethics rules, and the corresponding rise
of offsetting relational ethics interests, should be kept in perspective. These
188 For a study of judicial ethics rules governing campaign conduct and their relationship to
judicial self-interest, see C. SCOTT PETERS, REGULATING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: ASSESSING
STATE CODES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2018).
189 See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Georgia’s judicial
ethics rules governing misleading campaign statements does not afford the requisite “breathing
space” to protect free speech (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982))); Winter v.
Wolnitzek, 56 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (holding that a canon that prevents judicial
candidates from campaigning as a member of a political organization as well as a canon prohibiting
judicial candidates from making misleading statements violated the First Amendment).
190 Greg Goelzhauser, Intersectional Representation on State Supreme Courts, in OPEN JUD. POL.
65, 71-75 (Rorie Spill Solberg, Jennifer Segal Diascro & Eric Waltenburg eds., n.d.) (discussing
judicial diversification and its effect on the courts).
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disagreements may dominate public and academic discourse on contemporary
judicial ethics, but, with a few exceptions, they remain disagreements at the
margins. As emphasized in Part I, the high courts of all fifty states, and the
Judicial Conference of the United States, have adopted substantially similar
codes of conduct, derived from one of three ABA models. In our treatise on
judicial conduct and ethics, Alfini, Sample, and I chronicle a considerable
degree of consistency in the interpretation and application of ethics rules
across jurisdictions.191 The disagreements featured in this Article, then,
cannot and should not be spun as harbingers of systemic collapse, because
core judicial ethics norms remain relatively stable and strong. Rather, these
disagreements are indicative of a well-woven system of ethics that has begun
to fray at the edges. In the spirit of “a stitch in time, saves nine,” these loose
threads need hemming, but crisis talk is unwarranted.
The common denominator for most twenty-first century ethics
controversies is that the disputants have been unable to agree over whether
the macroethics need for a microethics rule is sufficient to offset
countervailing relational interests. With the possible exception of the
Supreme Court’s decision in White, which gave new bite to relational First
Amendment challenges to ethics rules that restrict judicial speech, these
controversies have arisen not because relational ethics interests are becoming
more muscular, but because macroethics interests are becoming less so. As
reflected in Part II, in setting after setting, the macroethics need for
microethics rules has been challenged as wanting, and when the perceived
need for a given rule is diminished, offsetting relational interests gain relative
heft. The challenge, then, is to reexamine the reach of macroethics values and
microethics rules, to the end of addressing an eroding consensus as to their
scope and thwarting spurious obstructions to consensus motivated by judicial
self-interest, partisanship, and unwarranted skepticism of macroethics
principles. That, in turn, implicates the need to strengthen codes of conduct
in their two primary roles: as a basis for discipline, and as an aspirational guide.
A. The Role of the Code of Conduct in Judicial Discipline
To reenergize the search for consensus on ethics norms, the stakes must
be high enough to fixate the attention of participants in the process. If judicial
systems do not take ethics seriously enough to impose consequences for
failure to abide by shared norms, the impetus to forge and live by such norms
is weakened. For the most part, state court systems have internalized this
point, at least in principle. They have generally embraced the rules embedded
in their codes of conduct as mandatory standards, the violation of which will
191

See generally GEYH ET AL., supra note 75.
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expose judges to discipline.192 Even so, state judiciaries have come under
recent fire for failing to impose discipline often or aggressively enough.193
The federal judiciary, in contrast, has resisted bringing the Code to bear
in its disciplinary process for decades. In 1973, the Judicial Conference
adopted the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct with “only a few
changes”194—one change being to exclude the Code preface, which
emphasized that the “canons and text establish mandatory standards” to be
enforced by disciplinary processes.195 This exclusion made sense, given that
the federal judiciary had no formal disciplinary process in place at the time.
In 1980, Congress authorized the circuit judicial councils to discipline federal
judges for conduct “prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of the courts,”196 and the Senate Committee Report
accompanying the legislation noted that when imposing discipline under the
new standard, “the judicial council may consider, but is not bound by” the
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.197 This qualification likewise made sense:
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act imposed a system of self-discipline
on a judiciary that was hostile to encroachments on its autonomy generally,
and suspicious of this encroachment in particular.198 Reserving to the federal
judiciary the discretion to decide for itself the role that the Code would play
in disciplinary proceedings was in keeping with the spirit of comity Congress
sought to preserve.
In 1990, the ABA revised its Model Code to replace the “shoulds” with
“shalls,” to highlight the mandatory character of the Code and its disciplinary
purpose.199 The Judicial Conference, however, declined to follow the ABA’s
lead. In 1992, it made modest updates to its Code in light of the 1990 Model,
retained the “shoulds,” and, in commentary accompanying Canon 1, explained
Id. § 1.06.
See, e.g., Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws or Oaths
Remained On the Bench, REUTERS (June 30, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/usa-judges-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/9WAV-C8RC]; Micheal Berens & John
Shiffman, With ‘Judges Judging Judges,’ Rogues on the Bench Have Little to Fear, REUTERS (July 9, 2020,
10:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-deals/ [https://perma.cc/
HYX2-XGPL]; John Shiffman & Michael Berens, The Long Quest to Stop a ‘Sugar Daddy’ Judge Accused
of Preying on Women, REUTERS (July 14, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/usa-judges-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/G3AV-WRJK].
194 Weaver Jr., supra note 47.
195 Walter P. Armstrong Jr., The Code of Judicial Conduct, 26 S W . L.J. 708, 715 (1972)
(citing M ODEL C ODE OF J UD . C ONDUCT , Preface (A M . B AR A SS ’ N 1972)); see also supra note
52 and accompanying text.
196 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
197 S. REP. NO. 96-362, at 9 (1979).
198 See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980)
(arguing that the proposed Judicial Conduct and Disability Act threatened judicial independence).
199 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text; see also MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1990).
192
193
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that “it is not intended that disciplinary action would be appropriate for every
violation” of the Code, because “[m]any of the proscriptions in the Code are
necessarily cast in general terms, and it is not suggested that disciplinary
action is appropriate where reasonable judges might be uncertain as to
whether or not the conduct is proscribed.”200
In 1993, the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal
reached a similar conclusion for slightly different reasons. Given the
“indeterminacy” of the statutory standard for discipline, the Commission
opined that “it was to be expected that chief judges and circuit councils would
seek more concrete guidance in the Code of Conduct.”201 “Yet,” the
Commission added, “the Code was not intended as a source of disciplinary
rules, and not all of its provisions are appropriately regarded as enforceable
under the Act.”202
In 2006, a committee chaired by Justice Stephen Breyer issued a report
on the state of the federal disciplinary process.203 The committee observed
that the statutory standard for discipline “does not appear susceptible to
precise definition,”204 adding that “[t]he standard is given such coherence as
it has by the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges and the accumulated precedent
of the circuits.”205 In at least two case summaries, the committee criticized
the circuit judicial councils for failing to take adequate account of the Code
of Conduct in disciplinary proceedings.206 The Judicial Conference, however,
revised its disciplinary procedures in response to the Breyer Committee
Report, by doubling down on its preexisting view that, unlike nearly identical
codes of judicial conduct adopted by state supreme courts in their respective
jurisdictions, the Code was neither mandatory nor enforceable:
Although the Code of Conduct for United States Judges may be informative,
its main precepts are highly general; the Code is in many potential
applications aspirational rather than a set of disciplinary rules. Ultimately,

200 Beth Nolan, The Role of Judicial Ethics in the Discipline, in I RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 867, 881 (n.d.) (quoting CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 1, commentary ¶ 3 (1992)).
201 Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal, in 152 F.R.D. 265, 344
(1994). I served as a consultant to the Commission.
202 Id.
203 BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 93.
204 Id. app. E at 147. This Appendix was prepared by the Breyer Committee for its own
use. Id. at 17.
205 Id. app. E at 147.
206 Id. at 79, 86.
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the responsibility for determining what constitutes misconduct under the
statute is the province of the judicial council of the circuit . . . .207

In their current incarnation, Judicial Conference rules governing
disciplinary proceedings reiterate that the Code may be “instructive” in
disciplinary proceedings, but that “ultimately,” discretion lies with the judicial
councils to determine “what constitutes cognizable misconduct” under the
Act.208 Commentary to the current Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, in turn,
acknowledges that the Code “may . . . provide standards of conduct for
application” in disciplinary proceedings, but reiterates the Judicial
Conference’s longstanding view that “[n]ot every violation of the Code
should lead to disciplinary action,” because “[m]any of the restrictions in the
Code are necessarily cast in general terms,” and “judges may reasonably differ
in their interpretation.”209
In the four decades since the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act became
law, the Judicial Conference and its helpmates have curtsied to the relevance of
the Code of Conduct in the disciplinary process,210 before adding a “but,”
followed by explanations for why that relevance is sharply limited. The federal
judiciary’s reticence to employ the Code in disciplinary proceedings is
measurable: whereas state supreme courts and judicial conduct commissions
routinely analyze and apply their respective codes of conduct to explain and
justify their decisions in disciplinary proceedings, the Code has been referenced
only three to four percent of the time in federal disciplinary proceedings.211
The varied explanations offered in support of the federal judiciary’s chronic
reticence to bring the Code to bear in disciplinary proceedings are specious and
unpersuasive. The assertion that “the Code was not intended as a source of
disciplinary rules” is correct in the hyper-technical sense that the Judicial
Conference adopted its Code before a disciplinary process was in place but is
wrong in the more meaningful sense that the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial
207 JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIALDISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 5 (2008).
208 2019 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, supra note 94, pt. E, ch. 3, at 9.
209 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 1 commentary (2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_
march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6KF-AFNZ].
210 See JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 207, at 5 (“The Code of Conduct for
United States Judges expressly covers a wide range of extra-official activities, and some of these
activities may constitute misconduct.”).
211 See Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willing, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and
Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
25, 84 (1993) (“Only thirteen (3%) of the chief judges’ orders sampled have cited the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges.” (citing ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED SATES 62 (1992))); BREYER
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 93, at 35 (“They rarely cited the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges (4% of the orders) . . . .”).
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Conduct—which the Judicial Conference adopted wholesale—was promulgated
for the explicit purpose of establishing mandatory standards of conduct for use
in disciplinary proceedings. The claim that the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
is too generally phrased to serve as a basis for discipline is belied by the fact that
nearly identical codes have been so used in state systems since 1972. While it
borders on the tautological to say that judges should not be sanctioned for
violating the Code when it is “uncertain” whether they have violated the Code,
five decades of precedent interpreting nearly identical codes across fifty
jurisdictions have reduced those uncertainties considerably.
Ultimately, the Judicial Conference’s defense of its longstanding view
flirts with incoherence. The federal statutory standard subjecting judges to
discipline for “conduct prejudicial to the effective end expeditious
administration of the business of the courts”212 is indisputably Delphic. To
conclude, as the Judicial Conference has, that when applying this murky
standard, it is better for federal judicial councils to exercise largely unguided
discretion than to default to the more specific provisions of a Code that was
designed by its ABA drafters for use in disciplinary proceedings—because
Code standards are sometimes generally phrased—borders on nonsensical.
Three consequences flow from the federal judiciary’s reluctance—but not
refusal—to impose discipline with reference to its Code of Conduct. First,
marginalizing the Code in disciplinary proceedings invites more seemingly
arbitrary decisionmaking, insofar as judicial councils are discouraged from
tethering their analysis of judicial conduct to clearly articulated canons in the
Code in favor of exercising discretion guided only by the unilluminating
terms of the Act itself (and whatever past practice has to offer). Second, it
liberates judicial councils to spare judges’ discipline under the Act for conduct
that the judiciary’s own code of conduct deems unethical and improper. As
the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council rationalized it, “Congress imposed a
standard for discipline that is significantly lower than, and conceptually
different from, the ideals embodied in the Canons.”213 The optics of judicial
councils dismissing complaints of misconduct for behavior that the Judicial
Conference’s own Code characterizes as unethical are unfortunate. Third, it
makes loose cannons of the Canons. By declaring that the Code “may”—but
mostly does not—provide standards of conduct in disciplinary proceedings,
rank and file judges cannot know whether or when disciplinarians will
disregard the Canons as so many damp squibs, or lock and load them as live
ammunition in disciplinary proceedings.

212
213

28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320 (Jud. Couns. for the 9th Cir. 1995).
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Reform begins by accepting several propositions. First, unethical judicial
conduct is conduct prejudicial to the effective administration of the courts,
within the meaning of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. Second, the
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges delineates the scope of unethical judicial
conduct. If the Code of Conduct deems specified conduct unethical, then
presumptively, that conduct should be subject to discipline under the Act.
There may be times when it is unclear whether the Code has been violated
because the Code is phrased broadly enough to be ambiguous in some
contexts—and discipline is inappropriate in those instances. But decades of
accumulated precedent interpreting codes of conduct in the state and federal
systems—codes adapted from the same ABA models—have significantly
reduced those ambiguities over time.
My recommendation, then, is to establish a default in favor of Code of
Conduct violations constituting conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts and therefore subject
to discipline under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. The federal
judiciary should replace the “shoulds” in its Code with “shalls,” as nearly every
state system has. If a standard of conduct that the Code specifies addresses
behavior that is undesirable but too inconsequential to warrant discipline, the
“should not” can be retained, a qualification added, or the standard removed
from the Code.214 A “default,” allows for exceptions when, for example,
discipline is inappropriate because the judge’s conduct violates the literal
terms of a Code provision in ways that do not constitute an ethical lapse. But
in the much more common scenario of judges who commit minor ethical
transgressions proscribed by the Code, it is better to structure discipline to
fit the infraction by addressing lesser misfeasances via corrective
consultations with the chief judge or private reprimands (as the Act
authorizes), than by looking the other way.
B. The Role of the Code of Conduct as an Aspirational Guide
To some extent, the federal judiciary’s chronic reticence to enforce its
code of conduct in disciplinary proceedings (in contrast to state systems),
can be attributed to a misguided conception of Article III exceptionalism
and a self-interested desire to minimize accountability from ethical
oversight. But there are also more legitimate concerns in play. The peril of
weaponizing codes of conduct for use in disciplinary proceedings is that
they strengthen the disciplinary role of the Code at the expense of

214 For example, rules governing disqualification might clarify that honest mistakes in the
application of disqualification rules do not constitute ethical lapses warranting discipline.
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eclipsing and so diminishing the second role of the Code as a source of
aspiration and guidance.
If the Code is understood, first and foremost if not exclusively, as an
adjunct to discipline, it transforms the Code from a body of principles to a
body of rules. That, in turn, risks shifting the inquiry from what a good judge
should do, to what a bad judge must do to avoid sanctions. Oliver Wendell
Holmes argued that:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.215

But in the context of judicial ethics, we want to know more than “the law
and nothing else.” The peril of a discipline-dominated code is that it can
encourage judges subject to its authority to view the Code through the eyes
of a Holmesian “bad man,” set aspiration aside, and structure their behavior
to comply with the minimum standards necessary to avoid discipline. Such a
code thus invites a race to the bottom and effectively makes “bad men” of all
subject to its authority.216 Randall Shepard, former Indiana Chief Justice and
past President of the Conference of Chief Justices makes this point wistfully
in his foreword to our treatise:
[W]hile the word “canons” still appears in today’s judicial rules, they now
read much more like a “code” and just about every “should” has become a
“shall” or a “must.” This shift to codification doubtless provides solace to
those who prosecute or defend in disciplinary cases, and it was probably an
inevitable product of a judiciary grown to tens of thousands of judges. I can
accept all that—and still sense that we have lost something of value in the
course of moving from aspiration to regulations.217

This state of affairs is by no means inevitable. Exhorting judges to do the
right thing and subjecting them to discipline if they do the wrong thing are
ultimately compatible courses of action. For jurisdictions that have given
primacy to the role of the Code in enforcement, the challenge is to revitalize
the aspirational purpose of the Code and bring that purpose into parity with
the disciplinary focus.
Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
David Luban expresses a similar concern that if a lawyer structures the advice she gives her
client on the assumption that her client is a Holmesian “bad man,” “the lawyer will shape the legal
representation in a way that makes the assumption come true.” David Luban, The Bad Man and the
Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1572 (1997).
217 Randall T. Shepard, Forward, in GEYH ET AL., supra note 75.
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216
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The spirit and purpose of the Code are embodied in the macroethics values
that microethics rules operationalize. Those values—most notably
impartiality, independence, and integrity—are core to the judiciary’s mission,
as stated in the Model Code’s preamble.218 But in this polarized, politicized
era, macroethics values are under scrutiny, if not under attack. The
documented suspicion that political ideology plays a role in judicial
decisionmaking has called the existence of an impartial judiciary into question.
To the extent that judges are seen less as neutral arbiters of law than
ideologically motivated legislators in robes, judicial independence from
popular and political control is perceived less as virtue and more as a vice. And
a judiciary that the public thinks is peopled with “activists” who feign
impartiality while abusing their independence casts doubt on judicial integrity.
The judiciary is ill-positioned to allay burgeoning public suspicion of
judges’ commitment to their own core values when judges, because of their
inability to agree on the scope of those values and their application, are
complicit in their own gradual descent into nihilism. Reenergizing the
judiciary’s commitment to its code of conduct and the macroethics values that
animate it requires broader and deeper participation in the process of
reviewing and revising the Code itself.
While processes vary, few rank and file judges play an active role in the
promulgation and review of ethics codes that govern their conduct. Rather,
the norm is for chief justices to delegate that task to committees, as they do
rules governing practice, procedure, administration, and lawyer conduct.219
Those committees may hold public hearings or invite public comment on
proposed rules, which affords highly motivated judges in the field an
opportunity to participate.220 And if the only objective were to ensure that
revised codes of conduct are sound and well-crafted, that is process enough,

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
New Code of Judicial Conduct Under Review, IND. CT. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://indianacourts.us/times/2008/02/new-code-of-judicial-conduct-under-review [https://perma.cc/
TA87-LU6L] (“In 2007, the Supreme Court appointed a subcommittee of the Ethics and
Professionalism Committee, Hon. Marianne Vorhees, Chair; Hon. Marc R. Kellams; Hon. Margret
G. Robb; Hon. Evan S. Roberts; Hon. Michael P. Scopelitis; and Hon. Dean A. Sobecki, to study
the new ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and to draft a new Indiana Code.”); see also Howard
W. Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct of 2009, 2009 ARK. L. NOTES 1, 3.
220 Cathal Conneely, Supreme Court Adopts Changes to Code of Judicial Ethics, CAL. CTS. (Nov.
14, 2012), https://www.courts.ca.gov/19892.htm [https://perma.cc/FCD6-EJBR] (“The committee
twice invited public comment on its proposed revisions and carefully reviewed comments
from a wide range of individuals and entities. The California Judges Association and the
Commission on Judicial Performance submitted comments that were particularly helpful to
the committee. Individual judicial officers and attorneys, the American Bar Association, the
Los Angeles County Superior Court, the Alliance of California Judges, and others also
provided useful comments.”).
218
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given that state committees begin their review with an ABA Model that has
already undergone years of careful vetting.
If, however, the objective is to reinvigorate support for the aspirational
role of the code among the hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of judges
within a given jurisdiction, more may be necessary. There is a body of
psychological science that confirms the value of actively engaging the
members of a group in articulating and affirming support for group
objectives, as a means to achieve “buy in.”221 Judges are busy people, and it is
unlikely that they will drop what they are doing and collectively engage in a
protracted process of reviewing, revising, and embracing their codes of
conduct as a kind of mission statement. But it is quite realistic for state
judicial conferences and continuing judicial education providers to feature
programs oriented toward consensus-building around code principles in the
course of working through some of the more provocative ethical dilemmas
that judges face.222 A silver lining of the COVID pandemic is that it has
normalized remote-meeting technology, which enables large gatherings to
break into small groups and promote universal engagement at low cost.
Conscripting that technology into the service of revitalizing the aspirational
role of the code in the lives of American judges is a worthy project.
CONCLUSION
This Article synthesizes the architecture of judicial ethics in a manner akin to
Professor Burbank’s seminal blueprint of judicial independence. Differentiating
between the macro, micro, and relational elements of judicial ethics reveals an
emerging pattern in modern ethics controversies, wherein diminished consensus
over the macroethics need for microethics rules has enabled countervailing
relational interests to take precedence with increasing frequency. This eroding
consensus, exacerbated by partisan and judicial self-interest, bespeaks a need to
revisit the disciplinary and aspirational objectives of judicial ethics to the end of
stabilizing the common ground that judges who subject themselves to the dictates
of ethics rules must share, if those rules are to continue serving their purpose.
221 See Kevin Thomson, Leslie de Chernatony, Lorrie Arganbright & Sajid Khan, The Buyin Benchmark: How Staff Understanding and Commitment Impact Brand and Business Performance, 15
J. MKTG. MGMT. 819 (1999) (detailing a study of 350 employees and managers that found a link
between buy-in, both intellectual and emotional, and perceived performance); Sarah E.
Pinkelman, Kent McIntosh, Caitlin K. Rasplica, Tricia Berg & M. Kathleen Strickland-Cohen,
Perceived Enablers and Barriers Related to Sustainability of School-Wide Positive Behavioral
Interventions and Supports, 40 BEHAV. DISORDERS 171, 175 (2015) (discussing a study of factors in
implementing a Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) program that found staff
buy-in to be most influential).
222 Judicial systems routinely include ethics issues in their educational programming, but the
consensus-building “buy in” I am proposing here is a different kind of project.
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